Indonesian Public Perceptions of the U.S. and Their Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy

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Pacific Forum CSIS

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# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Acknowledgements</strong></td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Executive Summary</strong></td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indonesian Public Perceptions of the U.S. and</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Their Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. interests in Indonesia</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical strains of anti-Americanism in Indonesia</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-American rhetoric and U.S. foreign policy</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War on terror</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The tsunami crisis: lessons from the heart</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compliance with and respect for Indonesian requests</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. efforts winning thanks</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy recommendations</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Appendices**

- **A** Milestones in U.S.-Indonesia Relations since Sept. 11 | A-1  
- **B** About the Author                                      | B-1
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Executive Summary

The rise of anti-Americanism among Muslims has been the subject of debate and analysis since the terrorist attacks on Sept. 11. Expressions of anti-Americanism have included violence, threats to harm Americans abroad, boycotting of American products, and anti-American rhetoric. While anti-American sentiment is nothing new, it is occurring at a time when the U.S. is heavily dependent on the support of Muslim populations to ensure the success of its nation-building initiatives in Iraq and Afghanistan, peace-brokering commitments in the Middle East, and its campaign to combat terrorism worldwide. Negative Muslim attitudes toward the U.S. also illustrate U.S. shortcomings in considering how Muslim opinion contributes to the success (or failure) of U.S. foreign policy.

This paper aims to analyze influences on public opinion among Muslims so that U.S. foreign policymakers can identify actions to win the hearts and minds of Muslims in Indonesia as a way to weaken support for terrorism. The paper also examines the major factors that have led to the loss of faith in American ideals and contributed to fervent anti-Americanism. Perceptions about the nature of the problem (i.e., the war on terrorism) and potential solutions (i.e., enforcing strict visa regulations on Muslim countries) differ strongly between the U.S. and Indonesia. While opinion surveys show that a majority of Muslims experience negative attitudes toward the U.S., interviews with Indonesians reflect that by and large Indonesians do not hate everything American, although they do not necessarily consider U.S. principles to be universal. Negative Muslim attitudes toward the U.S. are partly a result of inability of the U.S. government to communicate its message of pluralism, freedom, and democracy, and partly due to an inadequacy in current U.S. diplomacy.

The U.S. has good reasons to be concerned about negative Muslim opinion in Indonesia. The U.S. has five vital interests in the country. First, the rise of Islamic extremism in Southeast Asia has led Washington to declare the region the second front in the war against terrorism, and Indonesia is considered the weakest link. Second, as the world’s largest Muslim nation, Indonesia can serve as a model for Islamic civilization in the 21st century. Third, its geographic position puts Indonesia at the crossroads of global trade. Fourth, more than $10 billion in direct foreign investment and the presence of more than 300 major firms give the U.S. a direct economic stake in the country. Finally, Indonesia has served as a pillar of regional stability and security; a stable Indonesia is key to a prosperous and peaceful Southeast Asia.

Sustained resentment of the U.S. and its policies, if left unchecked, undermines prospects for building and maintaining cooperation between the U.S. and Indonesia in countering the influence of extremist and violent groups in Indonesia and promoting democracy and stability in Southeast Asia. However, as the tsunami crisis has shown, efforts to communicate U.S. policies can improve the image of the U.S. and favorably shift public attitudes favorably in Indonesia. While Indonesian approval of the U.S. has
doubled since the tsunami relief operation, it still lags pre-2001 levels. U.S. policymakers should balance Western and Indonesian resources to gauge Indonesian response towards the U.S. Consequently, it is important to develop a coherent, credible and sustained strategy that will help to ameliorate the conditions that produce religious and political extremism and anti-U.S. attitudes in Indonesia.

The strategy is three-fold. First, the U.S. should focus on increasing dialogue and multilogue on three levels: government-to-government, Muslim groups, and grassroots. Substantial efforts require specific and culturally contextualized approaches in reaching the masses of Muslim Indonesia who are diverse in their practice of Islam, and their convictions and commitments. In addition, the U.S. can also show that U.S. values are congruous with U.S. interests by providing additional aid and support through democratic reforms, post-tsunami reconstruction, and educational and public health initiatives. Finally, the U.S. government and private sector should help Indonesia achieve socially shared and ecologically sustainable high economic growth through capacity building initiatives, such as the promotion of good governance, development of Indonesia's energy sector, and the development and expansion of small- and medium-size enterprises, especially those that help empower women and drive economic growth and self reliance.

The contest for the hearts and minds of Indonesian Muslims is far from over. The war against Islamic terrorists is a political and ideological war; thus, it demands responses at the level of ideas. At a strategic level, it is political because the U.S. must erase the widely articulated perception of “West” vs. “Muslim.” It is “ideological” because the West must assist moderate, progressive Muslim leaders and intellectuals who want Islam to make a successful transition to modernity. This monumental task demands coherent, credible, and sustained U.S. efforts. Like most nations – and most people – Indonesians will respond to sincerity, courtesy, respect, and diplomacy. They do not respond to hectoring, posturing, threats, or hypocrisy. Closer U.S.-Indonesia relations are the first step in preventing radicalism to flourish in Southeast Asia.
“The U.S. government always lectures people in developing countries like Indonesia to be democratic, to uphold democratic ideals, to uphold human rights and tolerance. But at the same time they do different things which are contradictory to democracy. In terms of image and in terms of perception among the Indonesian people, the American government has lost its credibility to talk about democracy.”

Azyumardi Azra, president of Indonesia’s State Islamic University

“In an era when allied cooperation is essential in the war against terrorism, we cannot afford to shrug off negative public opinion overseas as uninformed or irrelevant. The governments of most nations respond to public opinion, whether it is demonstrated in the voting booth or in the streets.”

Sen. Richard Lugar (R-IN), chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

By virtue of its size and location, a stable, united, and prosperous Indonesia is critical to Asia and the world. An unstable Indonesia would adversely affect U.S. security, strategic, regional, and economic interests and objectives in Southeast Asia. However, since Sept. 11, 2001, U.S. efforts to fight the war on terror have led to an increase in anti-Americanism among Muslims. As a result, there is an unfavorable public perception of the U.S. in Indonesia, and these negative perceptions can cause serious problems. Anti-American sentiment has allowed Islamic extremists and their supporters to justify terrorist actions. Even though President Bush has repeatedly assured the Muslim world that the war on terror is not a war on Islam, Indonesian Muslims still feel threatened. These negative perceptions have created tensions within U.S.–Indonesia relations.

Fortunately, there have also been positive responses. When the U.S. signed an agreement with Indonesia in August 2004 to provide $468 million over five years for basic education, water, nutrition, and environmental protection, a Jakarta Post editorial described the contribution as “U.S. public diplomacy at its best.” The editorial argued the contribution is the way to “open the Indonesian minds and soften their hearts through compassion and generosity.” American tsunami relief efforts in Aceh have also produced a substantial shift in public opinion in Indonesia since the Sept. 11 attacks, showing a favorable increase for the U.S. and a dramatic drop in support for Osama bin Laden. As a result, U.S. actions to erode the support base of global terrorism have made headway among Muslims worldwide.

The challenge for U.S. foreign policymakers therefore, is not merely improving U.S. public relations efforts, but in identifying actions to win the hearts and minds of Muslims.

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Muslim Indonesia as a way to weaken support for terrorism. As such, it is imperative to analyze influences on public opinion among Muslims. Using Indonesia as a case study, this paper first examines the significance of Indonesia to the U.S. Second, it assesses the two events – the war on terror and the tsunami crisis – and analyzes how they changed public perceptions of the U.S. Lastly, it provides recommendations for U.S. foreign policy in its efforts to understand, inform, engage, and influence Muslim Indonesia.

**U.S. interests in Indonesia**

The U.S. has five vital interests in Indonesia. First, the *rise of Islamist extremism in Southeast Asia* has led the U.S. to declare the region a second front in the war against terrorism with Indonesia being the weakest link. U.S. defenses and intelligence officials maintain that Indonesia has become a haven for Islamic extremists and terrorists. Jeremiah Islamiyah (JI), al-Qaeda’s Southeast Asian arm, has created an intricate network of Islamic extremist cells across Southeast Asia with a strong base in Indonesia. Intelligence analysts believe that al-Qaeda operatives have trained many Indonesians through the JI group in terrorist camps and JI receives ideological, financial, and logistical support from al-Qaeda.2 “Despite various measures taken by the Indonesian government to strengthen its intelligence collection capability and the assistance it receives from Australia, the U.S. and other countries, Indonesia continues to have gaps in its intelligence coverage.”3 According to Rohan Gunaratna, head of the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies and Senior Fellow at the Combating Terrorism Center at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, the JI threat in Indonesia has not diminished since the Bali bombing in 2002, and he warned of future attacks taking place within Indonesia.4 Indonesia has been criticized for being slow to respond to this threat. To date, Indonesia has not yet declared JI a criminal organization. Because it is a legal organization, the Indonesian authorities, especially the police, do not have the power to target and dismantle the JI infrastructure. Equally alarming is the prospect of JI joining other militant groups in Indonesia and taking part in communal and religious fights within Poso, Ambon, and the Malukus. While the U.S. and Indonesia may not necessarily agree about the nature of the terror threat, they are determined to prevent further terrorist attacks in Indonesia. The fact that Indonesian Muslims have died in these attacks has made counter-terrorism a priority for Jakarta.5

U.S. aid assists the Indonesian government in preventing future terrorist attacks. The U.S. donated $50 million toward Indonesia’s counterterrorism efforts in 2002, of

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2 Interview with Dr. Rohan Gunaratna, Nov. 16, 2004.
4 Interview with Dr Rohan Gunaratna, June 16, 2005.
which $47 million was spent in upgrading police capability and $4 million on military training. The U.S. Department of State’s Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program has also helped trained Indonesia’s counter-terrorism policy unit, Task Force 88, which was credited with investigations leading to more than 110 arrests of terrorist suspects. In 2003, the U.S. Department of Defense spent $2.3 million on its Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program training 78 Indonesian intelligence officers in English language, military professionalism, and counterterrorism-related courses.

In recent years, assistance for police reform and training has been a major focus of the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta because the institutional separation of the police force from the military is a relatively new concept in Indonesia. In 2003, the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism spent $8 million in its anti-terrorism assistance program to train, equip, and organize a counter-terrorism unit within the Indonesian National Police. In addition to direct counterterrorism assistance and cooperation, the U.S. also sponsored several USAID projects such as health assistance, economic growth programs, environmental initiatives, natural resources management, and the development of civil society and democracy. The total USAID budget for Indonesia in FY2005 is $102.8 million, with more than 10 percent of the total budget dedicated to policy reform and training. Still, efforts to investigate Sept. 11 and eliminate terrorism in Southeast Asia are hampered by weak U.S. intelligence within Indonesia and limited knowledge in the U.S. of Indonesia. Interest in Indonesia is lagging: a Chicago Council of Foreign Relations survey found that only 33 percent of Americans thought the U.S. has a vital interest in Indonesia, a significantly lower rating than that given for countries such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, the Philippines, or Egypt.

Second, as the world’s largest Muslim nation, Indonesia can serve as a model for the Islamic civilization in transition to the 21st century as it demonstrates a viable and compatible partnership between Islam and democracy. Indonesia’s success as a democratizing nation and a market economy, coupled with its liberal, secular, and democratic values are important in shaping the mindset of Muslims worldwide, as well as in influencing the development of Islam in the world. A leading internet magazine in Indonesia described Islam in Indonesia as “extremely tolerant.” Paul Wolfowitz, former U.S. ambassador to Indonesia, former deputy secretary of defense and current World Bank president, has observed:

9 Personal communication with a U.S. Naval Officer and Indonesian specialist, Nov. 1, 2004.
“Indonesia stands for a country that practices religious tolerance and democracy, treats women properly, and believes Islam is a religion of peace. Therefore, the world’s largest Muslim country ought to be a model to the rest of the world [of] what Islam can be.”12

A third set of interests reflects Indonesia’s geographic position in global trade. Indonesian instability threatens international shipping lanes. Adm. Thomas Fargo, former commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific, noted that JI is a menace in the region and warned that seaborne terrorism must be taken as “seriously as attacks from the air, especially in the vital Malacca Strait shipping lane.”13 U.S. exports to East Asia (valued at $169 billion), together with one-third of world trade and 50,000 ships, pass through the Strait of Malacca. Thus, unimpeded transit through straits and sea lanes is critical to the movement of trade goods, strategic minerals, military forces, and energy supplies to sustain the U.S. economy.14 Japan and South Korea, two key allies of the U.S., also see maritime safety in the region as vital. Japan for example, imports 99 percent of its petroleum and 70 percent of its food by sea, mostly through the Strait of Malacca. These Northeast Asian countries look to the U.S. to ensure the safety and freedom of the sea lanes. Piracy and/or terrorist attacks in the strait could disrupt trade throughout the region through a collision, grounding, chemical or toxic spill or closing of a strait.

Therefore, it is alarming that new evidence shows global jihadists are entering Southeast Asia and using the sea as a launch pad for their attacks.15 Eleven seaborne attacks were recorded in Southeast Asia in November 2004, including the boarding and robbing of a liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) tanker in Indonesian waters. A recent briefing by the TNI naval chief of staff reported 121 piracy cases in Indonesian waters last year compared to only 15 cases in 2002. Attacks on oil tankers in the Malaccan Strait have also increased by 22 percent in 2002 and 2003. Sea-lanes in the Indonesian archipelago are also essential to U.S. national defense. An editorial in the Jakarta Post reported that “Indonesian waters have the highest frequency of piracy in the world and the Strait of Malacca is a potential target for Al-Qaeda’s terrorist networks in Indonesia.”16

Effective deployment of U.S. forces to any region of the world is largely dependent on quick and unhindered passage through the sea lines of communication (SLOC). As such, the U.S. Pacific Command launched the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) as a long-term, cooperative approach to counter transnational threats

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13 “Crack U.S. troops may be used to flush out terrorists in key Southeast Asian waterway,” Channel News Asia, 5 April 2004. Available at http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/78644/1_.html
by helping willing states build their maritime capabilities and capacities.\textsuperscript{17} The goal of the RMSI is to prevent seaborne terrorist and criminal assaults on nations bordering the Pacific and Indian oceans by forging a partnership of nations willing to identify and intercept “transnational maritime threats under existing international and domestic laws.”\textsuperscript{18} While the U.S. Pacific Command has been working with various countries in Southeast Asia since 2003, the RMSI will further enhance U.S. efforts in helping ensure peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region.\textsuperscript{19} The RMSI idea was however seen as “baseless” by Indonesian Navy chief Adm. Bernard Kent Sondakh. Nugroho Wisnumurti, a former director general for political affairs in the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, noted that the deployment of foreign [U.S.] marines and special operations forces was “not in Jakarta’s interests and anti-terrorism operations in Indonesia’s territorial waters signaled challenges to its sovereignty.”\textsuperscript{20}

Fourth, there are \textit{direct U.S. economic interests}. The U.S. has been Indonesia’s major market for decades. An estimated 3,500 U.S. business people work in Indonesia. Home to more than 300 major U.S. firms, Indonesia’s non-oil and gas exports to the U.S. reached $10.2 billion last year, up 13 percent from $9.8 billion in 2003. Trade and investment initiatives between the U.S. and Indonesia also offer promising opportunities for encouraging economic development and making Indonesia a much more significant trading partner. Moreover, Indonesia and the U.S. have revived the Trade and Investment Council (TIC) bilateral trade and investment talks in April this year in accordance with a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement that was signed in 1996, a move observers believe could lead to free trade negotiations between the two countries in the near future.\textsuperscript{21} On May 7, 2005, visiting Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick signed an agreement to provide $73.7 million in economic development aid to help the Indonesian government strengthen its anticorruption program, increase competitiveness in key sectors, and help create financial stability.

The energy industry is very prominent in Indonesia’s trade profile. Indonesia ranked 17\textsuperscript{th} among world oil producers and is currently the world’s leading exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG) with a 22.9 percent market share in the world market and over 33 percent share in the Asia Pacific.\textsuperscript{22} Indonesia also has proven natural gas reserves of between 170 to 180 trillion cubic feet (TCF), making it the 12\textsuperscript{th} largest in the world. Unlike other OPEC countries, these estimates of proven reserves in Indonesia are reliable because they are certified. Indonesia is also currently among the top 20 crude oil exporters in the world. Chevron Texaco is Indonesia’s single and largest crude oil

\textsuperscript{17} Interview with Adm. Thomas Fargo, former Head of the U.S. Pacific Command, Dec. 14, 2004.
\textsuperscript{19} See U.S. Pacific Command Website for more information. Available at \url{http://www.pacom.mil/rmsi/}
producer, accounting for almost 50 percent of the country’s total production. In addition, the U.S. accounts for 30-40 percent of the oil and gas equipment market in Indonesia. According to Zanial Achmad, deputy head of planning at a major foreign oil firm in Indonesian, oil and gas companies in Indonesia are expected to spend as much as $7.8 billion this year, compared with $7.49 billion last year, on exploration, development, and production. More importantly, Indonesia produces light sweet crude, of which two are highly prized – the Minas and Duri.

The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) estimates that there is a 50 percent chance that there is approximately 7 or more billion barrels of oil yet to be discovered within the Indonesian archipelago. Indonesia’s state-owned oil company, Pertamina, will lose its monopoly rights in managing fuel distribution in Indonesia in November 2005 as a result of oil and gas deregulation, allowing U.S. oil and gas producers greater investment opportunities when private companies will be able to build refineries and sell fuel products. However, this move may not be better for the energy sector in Indonesia as the country is plagued by corruption and inefficiency. As the parliamentary budget meeting in Sept. 2004 voted to cut fuel subsidies and Vice President Jusuf Kalla has indicated that the government “cannot afford to raise the subsidies,” President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono will be under pressure to act on fuel subsidies as prices have surged to record levels. Fuel price rises have long been a sensitive issue in Indonesia, and attempts to reduce subsidies and increase fuel costs will lead to violence and widespread unrest. Generally, a sharp rise in oil prices will translate rapidly into higher inflationary expectations followed by rising interest rates. This could trigger another financial crisis.

If more refineries are built as a result of the new oil and gas law, Indonesia will be able to reduce its oil imports (which is currently tying up liquidity and foreign exchange) as well as reduce its security risk and the U.S. will be able to win more production-sharing contracts. (Investments from production-sharing contracts in 2003 were estimated at $3.97 billion). During his May 25, 2005 visit to Washington, President SBY indicated that the contract of ExxonMobil to manage oil and gas fields in Cepu may be extended until 2030 (The Cepu field is estimated to have 2 billion barrels of oil and gas reserves amounting to 11 trillion feet cubic which makes it the biggest oil field in Indonesia after the Duri block in Riau). This development is significant as President SBY announced that Indonesia’s interest included increasing national gas and oil production and that Indonesia wished to maintain its status as an exporter country. Indonesia and the U.S. have also resumed bilateral energy consultations after an eight-year hiatus.

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23 However, the U.S. has to be mindful that Indonesians do not perceive Americans as taking over their economy or exploiting their natural resources.
26 Personal communication with a senior official of Pertamina, Apr. 21, 2005.
However, the U.S. needs to be mindful of the Indonesian psyche and sensitive in its investment approach. Indonesians have been concerned about protecting their natural resources from foreign exploitation since the days of President Sukarno. Should oil and gas liberalization be perceived to be inimical to Indonesia’s interests – either enriching foreigners or permitting foreign “intervention” – it will trigger negative reactions from the local community. According to Peter Eigen, chairman of Transparency International, public contracting in oil-rich countries such as Indonesia is plagued by revenues vanishing in to the pockets of Western oil executives, middlemen, and local officials.”

Corruption is another problem. Transparency International ranked Indonesia as the second most corrupt country in Asia, after Myanmar in 2004. Moreover, the World Bank reported that it takes 151 days for investors to start a business in Indonesia – five times longer than in Malaysia or Thailand in its recent Doing Business Survey 2005 report. More than 60 percent of Indonesian export cargo has to be transhipped in Singapore because of inefficiency and high costs, largely due to corruption. It costs $2,042 or 126 percent of the debt value to enforce a contract in Jakarta, but only $1,200 or 5.4 percent of the debt value to do so in Seoul. Thus, foreign capital, if not managed well, can contribute to corruption in Indonesia. In an exhaustive report, Trifungsi: The Role of the Indonesian Military in Business, Lesley McCulloch described the synergistic relationship between multinational corporations wary of unrest and soldiers in need of extra money. McCulloch contends that as much as 80 percent of the military’s budget comes from illegal activities like drug smuggling, prostitution, and illegal casinos, and security arrangements with corporations like ExxonMobil and Freeport McMoRan. In an interview with McCulloch, former Defense Minister Juwono conceded that “elements within the military had incited the unrest experienced by Freeport in order to highlight the benefits of their presence,” leading the company to forfeit $35 million to the military, in addition to an annual payment of $11 million. While in theory this foreign capital creates political stability and economic growth, in Indonesia, foreign capital in fact also contributes to political instability. However, in April 2005,

28 Ibid., Transparency International Corruption Index is a composite index that ranks countries in terms of the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians.
31 Ibid.,
Indonesia’s new anti-corruption court convicted former Aceh governor Abdullah Puteh for embezzling funds from the government to purchase a helicopter, marking the first high-level official to be found guilty. In May, the Attorney General’s Office named three top executives of Bank Mandiri as suspects in a loan scandal, leading investment bankers to feel “confident about the government’s commitment to improve the economy and stamp out corruption.”

The final U.S. interest is broadly defined regional concerns. The U.S. has viewed Indonesia as a “pillar of regional security in Southeast Asia.” Given its size, position, and role in the region, what takes place in Indonesia will have an impact throughout Southeast Asia. As the anchor of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a key player in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), founder and prominent member of the Non-Aligned Movement, member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), and the only Southeast Asian member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Country (OPEC), Indonesia has a powerful role in the region and beyond. Thus, a stable Indonesia will remain key to a prosperous and peaceful Southeast Asia.

Given these multiple interests, a favorable perception of the U.S. in Indonesia is imperative. Perceptions of the U.S. as arrogant, a bully, and a unilateralist will inevitably lead to complications in U.S.-Indonesia relations. Although U.S.-Indonesia relations have generally been cordial, undercurrents stemming from differences in priorities, perceptions, and expectations over the war on terror have led to strains. The key question therefore, is what the U.S. can do to better understand, inform, engage, and influence Muslim Indonesia to win the hearts and minds of the Muslim world and undermine support for terrorist organizations. A pro-active U.S. foreign policy that addresses negative perceptions of the U.S. will provide the foundation for closer U.S-Indonesia relations.

Historical strains of anti-Americanism in Indonesia

There have long been critics of the U.S. in Indonesia. The Sukarno era was characterized by a stridently “anti-Western, anti-American posture.” President Sukarno’s Partai Nasional Indonesia (PKI), an Indonesian independence movement party, was guided by elements of Marxism, nationalism, and Islam. For his part, President Sukarno was more concerned with developing a sense of pride in Indonesian nationhood than he was in foreign policy, given his vision of “one nation – Indonesia,

34 “Indonesia in Transition: Recent Developments And Implications for U.S. Policy,” Marie T. Huhtala and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and ex-Ambassador to Malaysia, Testimony before the House International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, U.S. House of Representatives, March 10, 2005. Available at http://usinfo.state.gov
one people – Indonesian, one language – Indonesian.” In one of his earliest speeches, Sukarno equated Indonesia with the “worm that will wriggle and turn,” illustrating the spirit of the Indonesian nation that would always fight for independence against “foreign imperialists.”

Moreover, Indonesian nationalism, manifested in its “bebas dan actif” (independent and active) foreign policy sought to maximize its room for maneuver in foreign policy which would in turn, enable Indonesia to adopt policies necessary to secure national interests while remaining free from commitments and encumbrances that may arise as a result of an alignment with external powers. To that end, Sukarno, together with others, founded the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) in September 1961. To date, NAM consists of over 100 states, representing 55 percent of the world’s population and nearly two-thirds of the United Nations’ (UN) membership.

As President Sukarno struggled to forge an Indonesian identity, Indonesian nationalism rose, leading to strong distrust of foreign major powers. This distrust stemmed from the struggle against the Dutch. The Indonesians had counted on a supposedly anti-imperialistic U.S. to support them in the fight for independence against their colonial masters. Instead, the U.S. chose to support its Dutch ally. It was only when Indonesia was on the brink of succumbing to a communist takeover that the Americans supported the Indonesian government. This experience reinforced the Indonesian need to be self-reliant and reminded them of the perils of outside intervention. The covert support given by the U.S. in two major incidents involving the CIA planted deep seeds of suspicion in the minds of Indonesians. They remember the U.S.’s alleged role in overthrowing Sukarno in 1965. Reports that the CIA was implicated in the horrific massacres in 1965-66 also drew public outcry. Indonesians also remember how Suharto became America’s “friend” even though he was corrupt and could be ruthless. Indonesian foreign policy is thus more ideological than pragmatic – political nationalism plays a key role in creating a strong sense of purpose in Indonesian foreign policy. Clearly, anti-American sentiments in Indonesia started long before the U.S. war on terror.

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37 “Pidato Sukarno,” Speech by President Sukarno, Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia at a mass meeting in Jogjakarta, Department of Information, Republic of Indonesia, Special Issue, No. 82, Dec. 19, 1961.
38 President Megawati was once asked by some Indonesians in Moscow whether she was worried that America would reduce its support for Jakarta since Indonesia was purchasing arms from Russia, to which Megawati replied: “people must not forget that Indonesia adopts free and active politics.” Quoted in “Megawati Belanja Senjata di Rusia: Apa Makna Politiknya ?”, RNW, Apr. 25, 2003. Available at http://www.indonesia-house.org/focus/militer/042503Russia_polandia_arm.htm
40 Ibid.
There is also a longstanding Muslim fundamentalism in Indonesia. This Islamic thinking also influenced the development of post-independence politics in Indonesia, reflecting basic differences about the place of Islam in the post-colonial state. Symbolizing the radical element of the Islamist strain was the *Dar-ul-Islam* movement (the Abode of Islam), which emerged with the waning of Dutch rule in the 1940s. Founded in the 1940s by S.M. Kartosuwirjo, President Sukarno’s strongest opponent, the *Dar-ul-Islam* movement seeks a purified Islam and the eventual establishment of an Islamic caliphate in the Southeast Asian region to be governed by *shariah* (Islamic law). Subsequent repression of Islam as a political force under the Suharto regime further influenced Islamic thinking in Indonesia and radicalized a number of Muslim leaders. Many of today’s radical Islamic organizations and leaders have their origins in the repression of Suharto’s New Order period. Political relaxation and liberalization post-Suharto enabled politically active Muslims to articulate ideas that differed from the political system under Suharto’s New Order. As a result, Islamist organizations and various socio-religious organizations started to emerge. These Islamic organizations (which are different from Islamic political parties) demand the implementation of Islamic *shariah* in Indonesia to counter what they see as the state’s failure to effectively administer and solve endemic problems that were not aligned with Islamic values or Muslim interests, such as socio-religious conflicts in provinces, weak law enforcement of gambling and prostitution, corruption, etc. Unfortunately, the various Muslim socio-religious groups also include Islamic radicalism and militancy.

Like other radical networks, JI’s origins can be traced to the *Dar-ul-Islam* movement. Although *Dar-ul-Islam* collapsed in 1962 following the capture and execution of Kartosuwirjo, two of its members, the late Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’ashyir, set up JI. The Australian-based Islamic student magazine *Nida’ul Islam* published two articles by Abu Bakar Bashir in 1996 and 1998 about Indonesia, including Bashir’s calls for *jihad*, citing *Quwwatul Musallaha* (military strength) as central to his organization’s struggle. JI aimed to destabilize Indonesia, overthrow the Indonesian secular government, replace it with an Islamic state, and establish an Islamic caliphate in the Southeast Asian region encompassing Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, the Philippines, Cambodia, and Thailand.

An Islamic state in Southeast Asia would have a population of nearly 420 million people (compared to the U.S. population of 280 million). The conscript base of men fit for military service would number well over 75 million, significantly higher

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43 Ibid.,
46 *Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Al-Jama’ah Al-Islamiyyah* (PUPJI), The General Guide For the Struggle of JI.
than the U.S. According to the CIA World Factbook, the establishment of JI was seen as a first step to this end. With this vision in mind, JI took its terrorist attacks to the world stage in 2000, with an ambitious series of church bombings across Indonesia. JI leaders also assisted the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks that destroyed the World Trade Center and damaged the Pentagon in 2001.⁴⁷

Despite JI’s involvement with Sept. 11, the Indonesian government did not clamp down on the organization, nor willingly detain any suspects. In fact, the Indonesian government repeatedly denied the existence of JI. Vice President Hamzah “guarantee[d] that there are no terrorists in Indonesia” in May 2002. Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexander Downer said that even though there were appropriate and specific warnings of the danger of bombs in Indonesia, the government did not respond accordingly.⁴⁸

Such indifference led to the terrorist bombings in Bali in October 2002, which killed 202 people and injured 200 more. In 2003, terrorists attacked Jakarta’s Marriott Hotel, leaving 11 people dead and over 100 injured. Two days ahead of the third anniversary of the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks and 11 days before the runoff for the presidential election, the Australian embassy was bombed. Even so, the public does not readily acknowledge JI as a terrorist group. Two days after the Australian embassy was bombed, the local Indonesian daily Kompas condemned the perpetrators, and even mentioned al-Qaeda in the article, but did not mention JI.⁴⁹ The daily highlighted Ismail Yusanto, spokesman for the Indonesian branch of Hizbut al-Tahrir, a hardline Muslim group that advocates the shariah as saying, “there is a possibility of a foreign intervention in this bombing.”⁵⁰ Likewise, Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia (KAMMI), an alumni association for graduate Muslims, called on the public not to speculate that the bomb attacks are linked to Islamic organizations or the Islamic community.⁵¹ Observers concluded that analysis is further complicated because “JI” is a generic term for Islamic community. Before the attack occurred, an unclassified FBI report showed that the most popular daily in Surabaya, the Jawa Pos, conducted a telephone poll over five days in Aug. 2003 and found that 44.3 percent of the respondents believe that “JI exists,” in spite of the government’s insistence that there is insufficient evidence to show that JI exists.


⁵⁰Ibid.,

⁵¹Ibid.,
As mentioned, however, the Indonesian government’s attitude has changed. Since the October 2002 Bali bombing, Indonesia has arrested 200 terrorist suspects, including 130 members of JI and convicted over 100 individuals.\(^{52}\) However, despite the fact that more than 100 key members have been apprehended or killed, its operational capabilities have been disrupted, its financial funds frozen, and frictions within its ranks have emerged, JI is believed to still have approximately 25,000 sympathizers. Radical Islamic forces in Indonesia have become strong enough to withstand the loss of official tolerance and periodic patronage. Other hard-line Muslim groups include *Hizbut al-Tahrir*, *Laskar Jihad* and the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI), and they are becoming more visible, assertive, and vocal in voicing their displeasure against the U.S.

The relationship between Indonesian terrorism and the U.S. is complex. First, these groups have reasons to be angry at Washington because it demands actions from Jakarta. Washington charges Indonesia has failed to take “tough action” against terrorism. Despite JI’s implication in three terrorist bombings in two years, the Indonesian government has yet to formally outlaw the organization. Second, pockets of Muslims in Indonesia are disillusioned and angry with the Indonesian government. Syafi’e Ma’arif, chairman of *Muhammadiyah* (MU), the second largest Islamic organisation in Indonesia with 27 million members, says that Indonesia is “full of corruption and people have become very, very frustrated.” It is no surprise that 74 percent of the Indonesian population favor reform.\(^{53}\) To the degree the U.S. fuels corruption – or ignores it – it becomes a target of Muslim ire.\(^{54}\) Muslims turn to radicalism and militancy because they believe that “Islam can offer the guidance and solution for the complexity of problems faced in Indonesia.” According to Ambassador Alphonse La Porta, former U.S. ambassador to Indonesia, there is “strong interest and vigorous debate in Indonesia today about the role of Islam in both national and personal life of Indonesians.”\(^{55}\)

Others are angry over Indonesia’s relations with Western powers. Some are still resentful over Australia’s alleged role (or interference) in the separation of East Timor from Indonesia while others have deep misgivings over U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. Peristiwa (incidents or affairs) are a style of public life in Indonesia – Indonesians tend to judge the U.S. not only on the basis of bilateral relations, but by its actions in the rest of the world. Hence, they see the war on terror as a Western ploy to weaken the Muslim world and extend Western influence. Some also view current military operations (or occupation) in Afghanistan and Iraq and its foreign policy as support for Zionism.


\(^{55}\) Interview with Ambassador Alphonse La Porta, May 19, 2005.
Although political observers say radical Muslims are a minority in Indonesia, they have the potential to threaten Indonesia’s fragile democracy and create unwanted friction within a pluralistic society. A revealing survey conducted in 2004 show that while 59 percent of respondents disagreed with the terrorist attacks, 16 percent supported the attacks. Indonesian researcher Sjaiful Mujani said the survey findings indicated that the public is divided over how to respond to the Islam-based agenda that exists in Indonesia today. Many Indonesians support the implementation of the shariah with nearly 60 percent saying they want adulterers whipped and 40 percent backed amputation of the thief’s hand, while 49 percent say they are not tolerant toward people of different faiths. Ulil Abdala, head of Freedom Institute, one of the organizers of the survey, and coordinator at the Jaringan Islam Liberal, finds the results troubling. “It is a worrying phenomenon because there is a strong indication that radical Islam is gaining ground. It’s definitely something that moderate Indonesian Muslims must take note.” As such, the U.S. should be vigilant and assist the Indonesian government in fighting radicalism.

Anti-American rhetoric and U.S. foreign policy

When we examine anti-Americanism, we must first distinguish between those who attack the U.S. for what it does, or fails to do, and those who attack for what it is. Islamic fundamentalists and terrorists attack for both reasons. Initially, Muslims, like others, expressed horror and sympathy at the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and sent messages of support and condolence to Americans. Parts of the Arabic press, together with Muslim leaders, issued strong denunciations of terrorism and empathized with America’s “grief.”

Muslim countries also debated whether U.S. policies were the cause of the attacks. As the Indonesian daily Kompas opined, “At this difficult moment, the American people – particularly the U.S. government – should ponder the course of its life and on its identity. If the U.S. likes to associate acts of violence with fanatics and fundamentalists in the Middle East, is it not a good idea to think why there are parties who detest the United States? We know that the U.S. stance toward the Middle East cannot be called ‘credible.’” When Osama bin Laden was charged with

57 Ibid.,
58 Ibid.,
59 Ibid.,
61 Ibid.,
masterminding the attack, Hasyim Muzadi, leader of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), one of the two largest moderate Muslim organizations in Indonesia, called for evidence linking bin Laden with the terrorist attacks. As Ismail Yusanto, leader of a moderate Islamic political party in Indonesia, echoed that skepticism saying, “What proof is there against Osama? None!” As one piece of evidence after another was cited by an interviewer, he simply shook his head.

Just a few months after the terrorist attack, anti-U.S. sentiment worldwide started to increase rapidly, leading millions of Americans to ask why “they [Muslims] hate us.” Various surveys indicated that a majority of the world saw the U.S. as an aggressor and the biggest threat to world peace. How was it possible for the U.S. to lose the public relations battle to a terrorist like Osama bin Laden? How was it possible that a dictator like “Saddam Hussein gets elevated, not merely as a potential victim, but in some cases hero status, while leadership of the U.S. is uniformly mocked?” As former UN Ambassador Richard Holbrooke succinctly put it, “… incredible as it seems, a mass murderer seems to be winning the fight for the hearts and minds of the Muslim world.”

Prior to Sept. 11, the U.S. was popular in Indonesia (it was the most popular choice for Indonesians to study, work, or migrate). After Sept. 11, the U.S. experienced a decline in favorable ratings from 61 percent in 2002 to 15 percent in 2003. Fifty-eight percent said they backed bin Laden; 72 percent of Indonesians opposed U.S. anti-terrorism efforts. Indonesian Ambassador Soemadi Brotodiningrat said that these findings are “warning signs of miscommunication,” and cautioned that “public sentiments can lead to complications” in U.S.-Indonesia relations.

The 2005 Global Opinion of the U.S. conducted by the Pew Global Attitudes Project indicates that “the rest of the world has become deeply suspicious of U.S. motives and openly skeptical of its word.” The report showed that people abroad are more likely to believe that the U.S.-led war on terror is really about controlling Middle Eastern oil and dominating the world rather than the U.S.’ stated objectives of national security and democratization. One measure of the paranoia is the widespread

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69 Ibid., p. 106
popularity of conspiracy theories that argued Mossad and the CIA were behind the Sept. 11 attacks.

There are other rationalizations for anti-Americanism apart from the war on terror and the invasions of Iraq. The U.S. stance on the Middle East has created longstanding hostility toward the U.S. among Muslims. According to Swara (Voice of the People’s Representatives), an Indonesian-based Muslim website with 3,478 registered members and 1,072,386 hits, the U.S. regards “Islam as its number one enemy since the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union. Therefore, the U.S. and Israel are united in fighting against Islam.”

Pusat Informasi Palestina (Palestinian Information Center), an Indonesian-based website has a regular column that urges its readers to boycott American products because of its support for Israel. Arabs and Muslims alike are angry over unstinting support for Israel and they resent U.S. attitudes that they believe conflate the Palestinian struggle against occupation with global terrorism. Ismail Yusanto, spokesperson for Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, said that he felt that the U.S. has double standards. On one hand, Hamas is included in the Foreign Terrorist Organization list although their only objective is to secure the Palestinian territory. On the other hand, Israel continues to terrorize civilians in Palestine, kills members of Hamas, and threatens Yasser Arafat and yet, is not considered a terrorist.

Dr. Riza Sihbudi, principal analyst at the Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (LIPI), said that the U.S. should not be a “blind supporter” of Israel, but instead improve its relations with the Arabs and the Middle East.

Jusuf Wanandi, founder of the Jakarta Centre for Strategic and International Studies, warned that unless the U.S. was more even-handed toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, moderate Muslim leaders in Southeast Asia would find it difficult to counter the influence of Muslim radicals on domestic public opinion.

Philip Bowring, one of the most perceptive observers of the Asian scene, wrote that “among Muslim Asians, there is particular animosity toward what they see as an overtly anti-Muslim campaign being drummed up by Christian fundamentalists and other pro-Israeli elements in Washington.”

Finally, and more important, Indonesians and Muslims worldwide find the war in Iraq unjustifiable. Lembaga Inisuthe Pengetahuan Indonesia, a Jakarta-based higher institute of learning expressed outrage that American soldiers set foot on a holy place

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70 “Mereka bersatu memaki Islam,” (They are united in humiliating Islam”) Swara Muslim, March 29, 2005. http://www.swaramuslim.net/more.php?id=76_0_1_0_m
75 Ibid.,
which is a mosque and crypt of Imam Ali bin Abi Thalib in the city of Najaf. The institute justified its condemnation by citing leading U.S. newspapers that criticized the war. The Indonesian daily Kompas commented that Bush invaded Iraq not because of the threat of weapons of mass destruction, but as a “personal vendetta” toward Saddam Hussein for attempting to assassinate his father, former President George Bush Sr. The editorial added that President George W. Bush wanted to “prove his masculinity.”

Pikiran Rakyat, a Bandung-based newspaper, likened the U.S. invasion in Iraq to “rape.” U.S. actions in Iraq are almost universally seen in the Arab world as a brutal attempt to gain control of Iraq’s oil reserves. U.S. detractors question the U.S.’ legitimacy in Iraq, adding that the reason for the invasion is purely “economics” and an excuse to “dominate the world oil industry.” As a result of its invasion, the U.S. has “alienated not only Iraqis, but other populations as well who feel powerless under a dominant and superior power such as the U.S.” Although the U.S. views its allies as Iraqi forces and insurgents as rebels, to many Islamists, resistance in Iraq is legitimate, a position endorsed even by pro-regime clerics who criticized al-Qaeda in the past. Islamists also treat the Iraq War as a direct assault on Muslims, which led then Indonesian Vice President Hamzah to personally denounce President Bush as “king of terrorists.”

Muslims in the Middle East are less supportive of the U.S. administration’s pronounced goals of democracy, freedom of speech, fair elections, and an impartial judiciary, and they perceive that the U.S. is trying to export and force its values on their societies. Some Islamist fringe groups in Indonesia view democracy as “un-Islamic,” while others find the U.S. call for “expansion of freedom in all the world” as threatening state sovereignty.

Regrettably, there is also a good deal of misunderstanding of Muslims in the U.S., too. Some Americans have come to view Islam with suspicion and as a religion of militancy. Faril Anwar, a reporter with Republika Online, commented that the U.S.

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83 Results from a nationwide poll conducted by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press in July 2003 indicated that 44 percent of Americans believe that Islam is more likely to encourage violence than other religions. Available at www.people-press.org
tends to consider Muslims as a homogenous group. Instead of searching for the root causes of terrorism, some have sought to explain the attacks by blaming Arab and Muslim societies. Some Americans mistake piety (Muslim women wearing headscarves) as Muslim fundamentalism or extremism. Stereotypes and prejudices of Arab Americans in the U.S. shortly after the 9/11 attacks further fueled anger among Muslims toward the U.S. The U.S.-based Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) combed through 10,000 articles published in over 500 daily newspapers and documented 645 bias incidents in the first week after the Sept. 11 attacks and discovered close to 20 homicides by Americans on American Muslims.

Muslim resentment of the U.S. and negative perceptions of its foreign policies, if unchecked, will severely undermine prospects for building and enhancing relations between the U.S. government, American companies, the individual American and their Muslim counterparts. The U.S. has two options. It can choose to believe that much of the problem is a giant misunderstanding, ignore the rhetoric and consider it trivial or nonsense, or it can renew efforts to bring about a better understanding of the Muslim world through constructive engagement. Al-Qaeda has been successful in exploiting its global network to disseminate its ideology and promoting the “jihad” cause through a modern and unconventional approach. Thus, it is equally important to recognize that the challenge for the U.S. is a struggle for the hearts and minds of the Muslim world.

**War on terror**

Since Sept. 11 2001, U.S. foreign policy has been largely driven by the demands of the war on terror. Indonesia’s then-President Megawati Sukarnoputri was the first Muslim leader to pledge support in Washington following the attacks. On Sept. 19, President Megawati expressed solidarity and promised to strengthen cooperation in combating international terrorism in a joint press statement with President Bush. She wrote an open letter to President Bush expressing her sadness and pledging her support saying, “Indonesia is ready for cooperation.” Her visit resulted in U.S. agreement to increase military contact, including training for Indonesia’s police forces, as well as to increase economic support. The total aid package pledged by the U.S. announced during her visit was more than $650 million. President Megawati pledged to resolve human rights abuse, in the East Timor crisis while the U.S. agreed to expand military interaction and end the arms ban. (Military ties between the U.S. and Indonesia were reduced during the 1990s due to growing concern about the army’s alleged human rights abuses in East Timor.)

While the Indonesian government condemned these terrorist attacks, radical Indonesian groups threatened to attack U.S. facilities and expel American citizens from Indonesia in the event of U.S. military action in response to the U.S. air strikes in

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Afghanistan. Youth activists lined up the streets towards the U.S. embassy, crying “God is great” and “chase out America, chase out all capitalists.” Approximately 4,000 demonstrators spoke with one voice in denouncing the American attack on Afghanistan and asking Megawati to break off diplomatic relations with the U.S. This was the biggest demonstration in Jakarta since the 9/11 tragedy.

After President Megawati’s announcement, several car bombs rocked a shopping mall in Jakarta’s central district. Observers suspected a link between the announcements and the attacks. On Sept. 23 and 24, groups in the central Java city of Solo opposed to U.S. policy undertook “sweeps” to identify American citizens and forcibly remove them from the country. The same groups also attempted to intercept Americans at the international airport in Solo. On Sept. 25, several hundred demonstrators in Bogor stopped and attacked cars believed to be driven by Americans or Westerners.

A day later, Dien Syamsudden, secretary general of the Indonesian Council of Ulemas (Indonesia’s top Islamic authority), called for all Muslims to wage a *jihad* against the United States if Afghanistan was attacked. A Gallup Organization poll conducted shortly after the overthrow of the Taliban regime found large majorities of Muslims believe that the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan was “morally unjustified.” In Jakarta, the U.S. embassy also reported that the Indonesian Islamic Council (DDII) representing 10 radical Islamic groups held a press conference at the al-Furqan Mosque in Jakarta and threatened *jihad* if the U.S. struck Afghanistan. Muhammad Kalono, a spokesman for the Islamic paramilitary groups, warned that “if America drops even one bullet in Afghanistan, God willing, we will wipe out all U.S. facilities and interests here” while the Islamic Youth Movement threatened to kill U.S. Ambassador Gelbard if the U.S. attacked Afghanistan.

Even the Council of Ulemas, representing the mainstream leadership of Indonesian Muslims, stated that any attack on Afghanistan would be an attack on Islam, making the connection between the war on terror and the war on Islam.

After the attack in Afghanistan, an editorial in the Indonesian version of the Japanese-Indonesia Economic Forum website criticized the U.S. by saying that even

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though the U.S. is a superpower, failing to capture Osama was a “disgrace” since that was the reason why the U.S. attacked Afghanistan.93

According to Arbi Sanit, a lecturer in politics at the University of Indonesia, hardline Muslim groups are using the Afghanistan issue to increase the size of their organizations as their “ultimate aim is the implementation of syariah law in Indonesia.”94 After all, moderate Islamic organizations such as Muhammadiyah and NU did not ask their followers to demonstrate. Moreover, Muhammadiyah leader Syafii Ma’arif believes that severing diplomatic relations will have an adverse impact on the Indonesian economy. “If America reacts and stops economic assistance, our country will be bankrupt.”95

Plainly, despite growing concerns about anti-American sentiment in Indonesia, there are different shades of Muslim opinion in Indonesian. Opposition to the U.S. air strikes in Afghanistan should not be mistaken as support for al-Qaeda nor Osama bin Laden. The fact remains that Muslims in Indonesia have largely ignored the call for jihad. Politics in Indonesia remains primarily dominated by local and national concerns, rather than those related to the U.S.

Thus, it is imperative to analyze why some moderate Indonesians considered the war on terror to be an attack on Islam. Interviews with several Indonesian East West Center fellows and recipients of Ford Foundation grant provide insight into this thinking.96

Language

First, the language used by President Bush following Sept. 11 when he stated he would launch a “crusade” against terrorism had a very negative connotation, especially to Muslims. The word “crusade” has historical implications, especially in the Arab and Islamic world to mean a war against Islam or between Christianity and Islam.97 This belief was backed by the theory of “clashes of civilizations” espoused by Samuel Huntington. Even though President Bush subsequently retracted the comment and said he “regretted using the word” after he was heavily criticized, it had already inflamed a racial and religious element among the Muslim world. The popular Indonesian website Detik.com said that the incident “hurt the feelings of Muslims worldwide, including Indonesia.”98

95 Op. cit.,
96 Personal Communication with Indonesian East West Fellows and Ford Foundation grant recipients, April 6-7, 2005.
This mindset may explain why President Bush’s visit to Bali in Oct. 2002, an attempt to court the world’s populous Muslim nation against Islamic militants and extremism, was not as effective as anticipated. During the visit, President Bush reaffirmed his commitment to the war on terror while praising Indonesia’s cooperation. President Bush pledged a six-year $157 million program for Indonesia to help improve education and counter extremism. However, Bush’s support for Indonesia was viewed only as “symbolic” by mainstream Indonesians. An editorial in a local publication, Media Indonesia, considered the visit to be a “transit” since the president was only in Bali for four hours. The editorial found that local Indonesians did not personally “benefit” from the visit since he only met with four “chosen” moderate Muslim leaders. In addition, the Bali Post contended that that Bush chose Bali because he “wanted to defy the terrorists” who had bombed the place earlier. The Bali Post chided Bush for not staying overnight in Bali and concluded that the visit was a contradiction – did Bush feel uneasy about staying overnight in Bali because he doubted the ability of the Indonesian authorities to ensure stability? In Bandung, more than 100 students at the Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia Association (AMMI) burnt three American flags, hung anti-Bush posters in the Bandung stadium and went on, Radio Republik Indonesia (RRI) calling for Indonesians to demonstrate against Bush’s visit to Indonesia. Hence, Bush’s reassurance that the war is not a war on Islam “failed to convince many Indonesians.”

Public diplomacy

Second, public diplomacy, a substantial tool in U.S. foreign policy, lacks coherence and consistency. “Public diplomacy seeks to promote the national interest of the United States through understanding, informing, and influencing foreign audiences.” U.S. liberals and conservatives alike have called for reinvigorating public diplomacy to improve counter-terrorism. Unfortunately, a task force led by Ambassador Edward P. Djerejian, former ambassador to Syria and Israel and former assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs, found that U.S. public diplomacy “has become outmoded, lacking both strategic direction and resources.”

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101 Ibid.,
In fall 2002, a $15 million media advertising campaign, Shared Values, fronted by a U.S. State Department financed group called the Council of American Muslims for Understanding (CAMU), and led by Charlotte Beers, a former Madison Avenue advertising executive and undersecretary of public diplomacy, attempted to re-brand America in the eyes of Muslims and inform the Muslim world about American values. It failed miserably. Although Beers acknowledged that the articulation of U.S. policy is vital to its diplomacy efforts, Malaysia’s daily, Berita Harian, summed up a common agreement among the Muslim media: “It is the foreign policy of Washington towards Islamic countries that is under scrutiny, not the treatment or the lives of American Muslims.”

This sentiment was similarly echoed by Marc Mealy, Senior Director at the U.S.-ASEAN Business Council in Washington D.C.

Therefore, when Beers concluded that there is a wide gap between what the U.S. is and how it is seen in the Muslim world, President Bush replied: “We have to do a better job of telling our story.” American embassies have distributed more than 300,000 booklets in 10 languages entitled “Muslim Life in America.” Additional programs included developing journalist exchanges, sending noted American writers such as poet laureate Billy Collins around the world, publishing an Arabic youth magazine, and developing partnerships between “Sesame Street” and Arab television networks.

Indonesians were unimpressed. The “Common Ground” series was pilot tested in Indonesia and Andi Mallarangeng, a U.S.-educated political commentator and heads a progressive party in Indonesia, argued the campaign highlights the wrong things. “The problem of the image of the U.S. is not because of what happens within the boundaries of the United States but what happens when the U.S. conducts its international affairs.”

Unfortunately, even though the Bush administration spends $1 billion a year trying to bolster U.S. image around the world, its public relations campaign did not manage to convey the sentiments of the U.S. government to the Muslim world. A report from the Congress’ General Accounting Office in Sept. 2003 concluded that the “U.S. State Department’s efforts have been scattershot and uncoordinated, foreign service officers charged with promoting U.S. image too often get stuck filling out paperwork, and one in five foreign service officers who are supposed to be helping the U.S. image aren’t fluent enough in the language of the country in which they’re stationed.”

Newspaper ads featuring Muslim Americans as well as a website, opendialogue.org to

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109 Interview with Marc Mealy, May 19, 2005.
encourage Arabs and Muslims to send comments and questions to American Muslims about America produced an angry comment from an ordinary Indonesian who said: “Do you really want to build a better understanding between Americans and Muslims, or do you just want to win this campaign? We’re not stupid or blind or deaf. We read your intention not by what you say, but what you do.”114 An Indonesian student at Jakarta’s National Islamic University agreed saying, “….sometimes we feel that America is a bully. If the U.S. wants a better image, why doesn’t it change its policies?”115 Djoko Susilo, a member of the Indonesian party, DPR, is disturbed by the increasing power of Jews worldwide and asserts that the U.S is supporting Israel as a result of lobbying by groups such as the American Jewish Lobby, the World Zionist Congress and especially the Coalition of the Christian Fundamentalist under the Bush administration. He feels that this support will enable them to obtain more power.116

Indonesian sociologist Dr. Arief Budiman admitted that while there are Muslim radicals and terrorists in Indonesia, Bush’s anti-terrorism campaign has inadvertently united the moderate Muslims with the Muslim terrorist because the U.S. lumped all Muslims as one.117 Sidney Jones, Indonesian project director at the International Crisis Group (ICG) found that “even the moderates believe that the U.S. has singled out Muslims for repressive action and treats Indonesia in a high-handed way. Indonesia never gets credit for anything it accomplishes.”118

Mixed signals

Many Indonesians find that U.S. PR efforts inconsistent with U.S. policies. For example, following the Sept. 11 attacks, the U.S. imposed new visa restrictions from 25 Muslims countries including Indonesia. Indonesian authorities criticized the move as “discriminating” and undermined the U.S. claim that it is targeting terrorists and not Islam. In 2003, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security adopted new measures requiring visiting male citizens from Indonesia, along with several other Muslim countries, to register with U.S. immigration authorities and be fingerprinted, leading to further protests and resentment among Indonesians. Indonesia also became the only ASEAN country requiring registration for its citizens in the U.S. Scholars and businessmen frustrated by the long waiting period for visas to the U.S. H.E. Soemadi D. M. Brotodiningrat, Indonesian ambassador to the U.S., described these security measures as “excessive over-reactions.” In addition, the U.S. has repeatedly issued

travel warnings to Americans to avoid visiting Indonesia even after the Indonesian government cracked down on the JI terrorists and assured tourists that there were minimal threats of future attacks on Westerners. These travel warnings have hurt the tourism industry, threatened livelihoods in Indonesia, and damaged the image of Indonesia and its economy, exacerbating public resentment. D’ai Bachtiar, Indonesia’s head of police, described the travel warnings as “unjustified” and “unfair.”

(Suara Karya, a local Indonesian publication, argued that travel warnings and threats of bomb attacks deserve equal attention from the local Indonesian authorities to project the image that Indonesia is serious about the safety of foreigners.

The Indonesian public also perceives the U.S. as a “bully” because the U.S. did not honor its promise to restore full military-to-military ties after Indonesia had supposedly fulfilled its end of the agreement to investigate human rights violation in East Timor. The U.S. was disappointed when the Indonesian appeals court overturned the conviction of three Indonesian army officers and a policeman convicted of the massacre of hundreds of East Timorese during the 1999 independence referendum elicited and the U.S. State Dept. reacted angrily on Aug. 14, 2004. The Jakarta Post reported that the verdict was greeted with cries of “Allahu Akbar” (God is great) among Gen. Sriyanto’s supporters, survivors of the massacre, human rights activists and Indonesian veterans alike. Yet the skeptics who believe that military personnel have impunity in the Indonesian courts should have been pleased when Maj. Gen. Damiri, a high-ranking Indonesian military official indicted for the military rampage in East Timor in 1999, was sentenced to trial in July 2002 for allowing forces under his command to commit violence. Former East Timor Gov. Jose Soares also became the first Indonesian official to be sentenced for imprisonment over human rights violations in East Timor. Seven members of the Indonesian Army Special Forces unit, Kopassus, also went on trial for the murder of Papuan independence leader Theys Eluay in January 2003. In this light, the Indonesian public is resentful because U.S. military sanctions ignore the progress Jakarta has made since 2001.

Dr. Leonard Sebastian, associate professor and Indonesian specialist at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies in Singapore argues that Indonesia wants to resume full military ties with the U.S. for psychological reasons rather than financial aid itself. “If the U.S. wants to normalize relations with Indonesia, why not go all the way. Why the charade?”

122 In Nov. 25, 2004, Indonesia rejected U.S. conditions for military cooperation.
123 Personal communication with Dr. Leonard Sebastian, associate professor, Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies (IDSS), Singapore, Oct. 25, 2004.
To be fair, the U.S. is caught between a rock and a hard place. On one hand, the U.S. has to deal with strong opposition from various parties; the most prominent of which comes from Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) who sponsored the suspension of Indonesia from the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. Leahy claims that Indonesia has not done enough to warrant the program’s resumption and that the army “is involved in drug smuggling, prostitution, human trafficking, illegal logging and many other illicit enterprises.”

The Congressional ban is widely supported. Apart from Leahy, the U.S. also has to assuage human rights activists within Indonesia and the U.S. as well as the international media.

Others argue that enhanced relations between the U.S. and Indonesian militaries are key to “encouraging the Indonesian armed forces to move forward with reform” and assisting Indonesia in maintaining stability and security within the Asia-Pacific region. Prior to the Congressional ban, the U.S. had trained more than 8,000 Indonesian officers since 1952, including Indonesian President SBY. Others note that the arms embargo is “counterproductive.”

Several incidents are obstacles to increased cooperation. An ambush in West Papua on Aug. 31, 2002, resulted in the deaths of three teachers, including two Americans, employed at the U.S.-operated Freeport gold mine. The incident has become a significant obstacle, due largely to the determined efforts of the families of the victims, to resuming full military ties.

Despite Western media reports implicating members of the TNI and Kopassus Special Forces in the murders and human rights activists calling for further investigation, local Indonesian dailies chose to highlight instead the need for Indonesia to continue lobbying Congress for the resumption of full military ties. The Indonesian foreign minister was optimistic when both he and President SBY met with former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger during their visit to Washington in May 2005. Foreign Minister Wirajuda was convinced that Kissinger would be able to help normalize U.S.-Indonesian military relations. Both countries applauded when Secretary of State Condeleezza Rice called for resumption of the full International Military Education and Training Program (IMET) after determining that the Indonesian

126 Personal communication with USAF (ret.) Col. Edward T. Boswell, currently general manager of NORDAM, the largest privately owned FAA approved repair station, Dec. 30, 2004. In 2003, former President Megawati bought four Sukhois and two Mi-35 assault helicopters from Russia and two submarines from South Korea as part of an attempt to rebuild the country’s defense capabilities, which the military claims have been decimated by the U.S. embargo since 1999. As such, Indonesia hosted its first international defense exhibition with more than 250 participants in November 2004.
government and the Armed Forces of Indonesia (TNI) have cooperated with the FBI’s investigation into the Freeport murders.129

The Abu Bakar Bashir trial has caused complications, too. Widely described as the spiritual leader of JI, Bakar was charged with Bali involvement in the suicide bombing of the Marriott Hotel in 2003, and the bombings in 2002 but he was acquitted of terrorism charges in Indonesia in 2003. However, the Indonesian government continued to hold him in jail while seeking evidence to support new charges under pressure from the U.S. and Australia.130 An article in Utusan Patani alleged that during the court proceedings, Indonesia was asked by the U.S. to hand Bashir over to the U.S. while Bashir continued calling Bush the “enemy of Allah.”131

The U.S. is also accused of hypocrisy. It demands convictions of suspects but does not assist in the prosecution. The Indonesian government was not allowed access to key witnesses against Bashir who were held by the CIA in secret locations. For example, after the U.S. successfully apprehended Hambali, a JI leader, mastermind of the Bali bombing, and key link to al-Qaeda, Indonesian authorities requested the right to question him.132 The U.S. has repeatedly agreed to allow Indonesian intelligence authorities the opportunity since October 2003, even after then President Megawati and head of police D’ai Bachtiar visited Washington to lobby for access.133 To date, the Indonesians still do not have access to Hambali. As such, it was difficult for the Indonesian government to prosecute Bashir without Hambali being called as a witness, and giving Bashir’s lawyers an opportunity to cross-examine him. As a result, Bashir was sentenced to 30 months in prison for conspiracy in the 2002 Bali bombings, but cleared of terror charges. The New York Times reported a senior intelligence official saying: “They [U.S.] cannot have it both ways, on the one hand pressing the Indonesians to prosecute Bashir, but on the other not giving Indonesian prosecutors the assistance they need.”134 When the sentenced was passed, the U.S. expressed regret and disappointment.

The U.S.’ reaction was taken badly by many Indonesians. The website for the Muslimah Majelis Mujahidin (MMM) which espouses the shariah law, said that the U.S. was “persistent” in finding ways to persecute Bashir even though the outcome was already known.135 Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Marty Natalegawa expressed displeasure with Ambassador Ralph Boyce’s efforts in pressuring D’ai Bachtiar and the

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131 Ibid.,
Head of Muhamiddiyah to help convict Bashir. According to Natalegawa, Indonesia is a democracy and everyone must honor the court’s outcome and not interfere.136 After all, 66 percent of Indonesians are satisfied with performance of Indonesia’s Constitutional Court.137 Nuim Khaiyath, the executive producer of the Indonesian Service at Radio Australia, observed that a recurrent theme in the popular press in Indonesia was the notion that the Indonesian government pursued Abu Bakar Bashir because of external pressure, and Indonesians felt that had it been entirely up to the Indonesian system, Abu Bakar Bashir would still be teaching at the Al Mukim pesantren, in Solo.138

**Impact of international media**

Public opinion is affected greatly by the media. Muslims today receive their news, interpretation and analysis of U.S. policies from satellite television, the Internet, and other innovative media. The nature and content of these communication sources vary in effect and quality. Images and news depend on whether Muslims watch CNN or Al-Jazeera. Arab satellite television stations are accessible to Indonesian Muslims, tending to feed an anti-Western propaganda with a pro-Palestine bias. The use of unmuzzled dogs (considered ritually unclean by Muslims) to humiliate and intimidate prisoners at Abu Ghraib caused an uproar among Muslims worldwide. TV footage of these unfortunate events, in all their vividness and specificity, have extraordinary power to fuel resentment against the U.S.

Second, the pressure for the media to get the news out first has become so intense that competition among journalists can lead to misinformation, compromising both responsible and relevant reporting. Baseless allegations are sometimes made to sell more copies, attract more viewers or listeners. Perceived incidents of abuse by U.S. authorities – even if they were not true – are extremely damaging to America’s image. The alleged desecration of the Al-Qur’an by American soldiers while interrogating detainees in Guantanamo Bay led thousands of Muslims, including Indonesia to denounce the U.S. Leaders of Indonesian Islamic organizations such as Indonesian Council of Clerics (MUI), Indonesian Mujahiddin Council (MMI) and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) called it a “blasphemy” and an outright “human rights violation.” Fauzan Al-Anshari, Head of Data and Information Department at MMI said that the goal was “demoralize Muslims.”139

The Indonesian media also tends to politicize events since the fall of Suharto in 1998. Newspapers, weeklies, tabloids, newspaper syndicates radio and television stations are now entirely private owned, unregulated and for profit. The downside of this new-found freedom of the press in Indonesia is the temptation toward

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137 Public Opinion Indonesia 2005.
sensationalism and outrageous reporting which sometimes lead to publishing unsubstantiated speculations.

Similarly, the Western media also often stereotypes Islam as a repressive and oppressive religion. This misinterpretation may be viewed by Indonesian Muslims studying or living in America and reported back home. What these students report to families, friends, and relatives in Indonesia can have a substantial impact on the views adopted by Indonesian Muslims.\textsuperscript{140}

There are encouraging signs, however. Polling by Zogby International reported that Muslims generally approve of American science and technology, American-made products, American education, and American entertainment.\textsuperscript{141} In contrast, negative Muslim attitudes toward the U.S. are driven by aversion to U.S. policies, especially those that are perceived to have a negative impact on the Middle East and other Muslim region. Despite strong Muslim opposition to the U.S.-led war in Iraq however, recent developments have been positive. There is an elected government in Baghdad. The Iraqi legislature is proceeding with the writing of a new constitution. Life has resumed to near-normalcy in many parts of Iraq. And more important, the insurgency has not become a mass anti-American movement. A majority of Indonesians are moderate Muslims who oppose terrorism, although they do not support all U.S. counterterrorism tactics. Demonstrations against the U.S. so far have also been peaceful and non-violent.

Given the delicate political reality in Indonesia, how Washington should move forward is as important as the policy it pursues. Therefore, it is vital for the U.S. to go beyond traditional tools such as increasing intelligence and military defenses and develop a long-term strategy for building and maintaining mutual trust and understanding between Americans and Muslims worldwide and ultimately defeating the ideological movement of Al-Qaeda. The battle to win the hearts and minds of the Muslims world is still winnable, but Washington has to fight smarter.

The tsunami crisis: lessons from the heart

While U.S. efforts in the terrorism campaign triggered unintended anti-American sentiment and eroded Muslim’s support away, the assistance offered by the U.S. during the tsunami crisis helped create a positive image among the Muslim population in Indonesia.

On Dec. 26, 2004, a 9.0 earthquake hit South and Southeast Asia and Africa, with the largest number of casualties in Banda Aceh, Indonesia. A province with a

\textsuperscript{140} The Institute of International Education (IIE) reports that Indonesia is the ninth-leading place of origin for students in the U.S., constituting 1.8 percent of total foreign students in the U.S.

\textsuperscript{141} America as Seen through Arab Eyes; Polling the Arab World after Sept. 11th, John Zogby, (Utica, NY: Zogby International, 2003). The survey showed that 80 percent of Indonesians support American science and technology while 71 percent support American-made products which belies the contention that contention that anti-American sentiment among Indonesian Muslims is not the result of a clash of cultures or values.
population of 4.2 million, Banda Aceh’s estimated death toll stands at 126,732, with 93,662 people missing and more than half a million displaced.\textsuperscript{142}

At first, the U.S. response to the crisis was criticized as “slow.” Its initial pledge of $35 million was described as “stingy.” After mounting criticism, aid was increased to $350 million. To date, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has provided more than $52.2 million in emergency food assistance, relief supplies, shelter, water and sanitation, health, and livelihoods, among many other things. Along with other U.S. government agencies, USAID also worked closely with the Indonesian government to provide relief and other support for affected communities in Aceh and North Sumatra. Private-sector donations for the tsunami relief efforts, spearheaded by former presidents Bill Clinton and George Bush Sr., are estimated at more than $700 million.\textsuperscript{143}

The Department of Defense responded quickly to the tragedy. Within 48 hours of the catastrophe, the U.S. Pacific Command was already establishing a joint task force to coordinate and conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. The U.S. military brought large stocks of medicines and materials, together with water and food to Aceh. Led by Secretary of State Powell, the U.S. organized a “core group” initiative comprised of the U.S., Japan, Australia, India, Canada, and with many others to identify and fill gaps in the relief effort until the U.N could be mobilized. A week after the tsunami, the U.S. aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln anchored offshore Sumatra, carrying supplies to the largely inaccessible province. In all, the U.S. mobilized two of its carriers to the waters of Sumatra; the USS Abraham Lincoln and USS Bonhomme Richard. Some 16,000 personnel, 75 helicopters, over 100 aircraft and more than two dozen U.S. ships including floating hospitals at an estimated cost of over $5 million per day were dedicated to the humanitarian mission.\textsuperscript{144} Each day, 300 U.S. military personnel went ashore to carry out humanitarian operations.\textsuperscript{145} The U.S. Navy and Marines delivered nearly 3.5 million pounds of aid supplies – about 150,000 pounds a day – since starting operations on Jan. 1. By the time the major relief effort ended, more than a million refugees were fed with over 24 million pounds of relief supplies and equipment were delivered when U.S. military aircraft flew over 3,500 sorties.\textsuperscript{146} Six maritime prepositioned ships from Guam and Diego Gracia also provided critical drinking water to prevent widely predicted outbreaks of malaria and other diseases. The U.S. military operation was cited as the largest in the region since the Vietnam War.

\textsuperscript{143} “U.S. support for earthquake and tsunami victims,” U.S. White House, March 8, 2005. Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/tsunami/
\textsuperscript{146} Op. Cit., Cossa
On Jan. 6, 2005, then Secretary Powell met with leaders from 26 nations, U.N. agencies, and nongovernmental organizations in Bangkok and pledged that U.S. scientists and technicians would help Indian Ocean nations with tsunami warnings to South and Southeast Asian countries until the region establishes its own alert system. Powell then relegated control for the core group to the United Nations. Later, Powell and Florida Gov. Jeb Bush, the personal representative of his brother President Bush, arrived in Banda Aceh to observe areas worst hit by the tsunami. Powell and Gov. Bush later attended the Special ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting on the Aftermath of Earthquake and Tsunamis in Jakarta. In response to the U.S. gestures, President SBY, senior government, military officials and Muslim leader welcomed the humanitarian aid, saying: “Indonesians should put aside their political differences with the U.S.” The U.S. also agreed to build a $245 million road along the Banda Aceh’s western coast during Deputy Secretary of State Zoellick’s visit to Indonesia in May 2005.

While it is reasonable and obvious to assume that the humanitarian aid offered by the U.S. will buy goodwill in the Muslim world (people will love you if you give them money), missteps, mishandling, and misjudgements on the part of the U.S. could still undermine progress in the relationship. As a highly nationalistic country, Indonesia is extremely sensitive about foreign troops on their soil. The U.S. has to consider a set of complexities ranging from cultural sensitivities to issues of sovereignty and national pride even while it provides humanitarian relief.

**Compliance with and respect for Indonesian requests**

The U.S. has recognized the potential pitfalls and responded well. First, the U.S. response was fast, effective, and well-coordinated, even though the military was severely overextended in Iraq. More importantly, the U.S. military personnel, mindful of the Indonesian concern about foreign troops, overcame local concerns by working closely with their Indonesian military counterparts. This led to relatively smooth and effective cooperation in the relief efforts. In addition, efforts made by the U.S. were done in a multilateral fashion. Even though the U.S. initially spearheaded the relief efforts, it relegated control of the Core Group Initiative to the U.N., signalling that the U.S. does not have a unilateral intent, but was part of an international effort.

Second, the U.S. made a show of providing high-level attention to Indonesia by sending other personalities such as Secretary Powell, Governor Bush and former Presidents Clinton and Bush Sr. These gestures, although largely symbolic, resonated well with Indonesians. According to the accounts given by an American journalist, cheers and thumbs up from the survivors when U.S. sailors came with aid was like a “big whoosh of fresh air,” given the recent anti-American rhetoric. A local imam (religious leader) told the journalist that they were grateful for the U.S. assistance.

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saying:” For every gift America gives us, we have to repay America a thousand times over with kindness.” Another Achenese said: “I think helping the people of Aceh would be a good way to illustrate to the people of Indonesia that you care about helping others.” In February 2005, Indonesians were thrilled when Amani Toomer and Kurt Warner from NFL’s New York Giants visited Banda Aceh as part of the UN’s World Food Program.150 Dr. Humam Hamid, chairman for the Aceh Recovery Forum, testified before a U.S.-Indonesia (USINDO) event in D.C. on May 13, 2005 that the “Achehnese were truly grateful.”

Lastly, U.S. actions reflected sensitivity to local sentiments. For example, when Vice President Jusuf Kalla announced Jan. 12 that foreign troops must leave by late March, U.S. Ambassador Pascoe responded by saying that “they [Indonesian government] have every right to decide” how long American troops are needed.”151 Ambassador Pascoe further reassured Indonesians that “American troops would help in Indonesia as long as they were needed and ‘not a minute later.’”152 His comments was reiterated by Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz who said that the “U.S. goal is to end its military presence in Indonesia as soon as possible.” At a press conference in Kuala Lumpur, Adm. Fargo, then head of U.S. Pacific Command, said that U.S. military will “start right now transferring functions to the appropriate host nations and international organizations” and planned to withdraw 15,000 U.S. troops in the next 60 days. Two days later, the Indonesian government imposed restrictions on the movement of foreigners in the strife-torn province because of possible “threat from separatist rebels of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM). In response, Pascoe said he understood Indonesia’s decision and that every government has the right to check on foreigners that are in their country” and called the restrictions “reasonable and unremarkable.”153 Still, suspicion of the U.S. remains high among some Indonesian Muslim leaders. The Antara, Indonesia’s News Agency, reported that some Indonesians regretted the decision of the Indonesian government in allowing foreign troops to enter Banda Aceh.154 Ishak Rahman, a representative of the Universitas Hasanuddin, was concerned that the admission of U.S. troops might ignite a fresh round of attacks by the GAM rebels.155

On Feb. 5, at the request of the Indonesian government, the USS Abraham Lincoln departed. Indonesian officials, including armed forces commander Gen.

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155 Ibid.,
Endriarto Sutarto and Welfare Minister Alwi Shihab attended a small ceremony held aboard the ship to thank the officers and sailors who carried out the humanitarian operation. On March 28, when another 8.7 magnitude earthquake struck Indonesia, the U.S. dispatched *USS Mercy*, a 1,000-bed hospital ship, off the coast of Nias to provide disaster relief and medical assistance.\(^{156}\)

**U.S. efforts win thanks**

The U.S. aid efforts in Indonesia generated goodwill from the Muslim population, as voiced by Suripto, foreign affairs spokesman for Indonesia’s *Prosperous Justice Party*, a conservative Muslim movement. He said: “American involvement in the relief and humanitarian efforts is a great and praiseworthy step.”\(^{157}\) President SBY echoed similar sentiments at a recent USINDO dinner when he said: “There has been an incredibly deep emotional connection between America and Indonesia since the tsunami. Mainstream America became visually and emotionally, exposed to Indonesia’s tremendous agony.”\(^{158}\)

Some critics, however, claim that U.S. efforts were motivated by a desire to win Muslim friends and influence people. An Islamist website was quoted as saying that U.S. efforts were “half-hearted.”\(^{159}\) Habib Rizieq Shihab, head of the hardline Islamist group, the Islamic Defender’s Front (FPI), was quoted as saying that foreign troops “corrupt [Banda Aceh’s] strict Islamic culture.”\(^{160}\) Dewi Fortuna, an Indonesian political analyst at the Jakarta-based Habibie Center observed that it is unlikely that Indonesia’s Islamic extremists will change their view of the U.S. any time soon. A former TNI general also cautioned against relying solely on Western media for Indonesian responses which were too “optimistic and simplistic.”\(^{161}\)

Results from a recent poll conducted by the *Lembaga Survei Indonesia* (LSB) however showed that 65 percent of Indonesians view the U.S. favorably and backing for Osama bin Laden dropped from 58 percent in 2003 to 23 percent.\(^{162}\) Indonesians opposing U.S. anti-terror efforts also declined by half, from 72 percent in 2003 to 36 percent in 2005.\(^{163}\) The results were described as the “first substantial shift of public opinion in the Muslim world” since Sept. 11.\(^{164}\) These developments should give the

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161 Personal communication with former TNI general and current senior advisor to the UN Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery (UNSFIR), July 27, 2005.
163 Ibid.
164 Ibid.
U.S. hope, as they indicate that misperceptions can be changed. However, changes in the way U.S. public diplomacy is conducted are essential to redress deterioration in the public support for the U.S. and its policies, especially in the Muslim world. It must also be noted that although favorable ratings recovered substantially from 15 percent in 2003 to 38 percent in 2005, it was still lower than in 2002 when 61 percent of the population had favorable views of the U.S.

U.S. actions and words both communicated urgency about the crisis and U.S. understanding of Indonesia’s national interest. The crisis has proven, as horrible as it was, to be an opportunity for the U.S. to prove to the world what it can do, and is capable of doing.

Policy recommendations

The U.S. faces numerous challenges in countering negative perceptions among Indonesian Muslims. This paper outlines three key recommendations for U.S. foreign policymakers, by they are by no means exhaustive. These recommendations seek to understand, inform, engage, and influence Muslim Indonesia and win their hearts and minds as a way to weaken support for terrorism.

1) Increase dialogue

As alluded above, negative Muslim attitudes towards the U.S. is partly due to the inability of the U.S. government to get its message of pluralism, freedom, and democracy across and to explain itself to Muslims. The U.S. should engage the Muslims through increased dialogue and multilogue among three constituencies: governments, Muslims, and the grassroots.

Government-to-government relations

The U.S. government can increase interactions with its Indonesian counterpart through exchange programs and capacity-building initiatives. As an example, Indonesian parliamentary staffers can spend time learning from the U.S. Congress. Joint exercises, patrols, and military training can also increase interaction and information sharing between government officials. To reduce misunderstanding, rumors, and disinformation, consultation between the U.S. embassy in Jakarta and Indonesian government officials should be increased, particularly on issues pertaining to visa and travel warning issues. This will help ensure that U.S. regulations are understood.

Track-two initiatives such as the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) are also effective channels where members can share differing perceptions, fears, and needs, and to explore ideas for resolution. Communication, understanding, and dialogue between different peoples with different beliefs should be enhanced whenever possible. More importantly, as much of the truth as can be must be told. Explanations will generate greater trust and a greater willingness to accept different perspectives. In mutual dialogue, greater empathy and consensus will emerge.
Dialogue with the Muslim community is essential. The U.S. should strengthen moderate Muslim groups and support their network of pesantren, ulama, and intellectuals who are grounded in the rhetoric of democracy, justice, and human rights. The U.S. should also engage Muslim youth organizations through public forums, or visits to pesantren, madrasahs, Islamic universities, colleges, and institutes, administered through NGOs or directly (Indonesians under the age of 30 make up 60 percent of the population and are growing at a rate of 1.9 percent per year).

Local Muslim religious leaders also need to stimulate public dialogue with their communities during Friday prayers to ensure that militant and radical Islam do not gain a foothold within their constituencies. It will also allow conservative Muslims the opportunity to air their suspicions about modernity, innovation, and change. Moderate Muslims also need to speak out against radicalism without compromising on the fear of losing support from the mainstream Muslims in Indonesia.

Similarly, ensuring that the moderates are heard and respected is as important as allowing them the opportunity and medium to acquire information on U.S. interests and intentions. Creation of an international moderate Muslim network, i.e. the Asia-Middle East Dialogue (AMED) in Singapore and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in Yemen, is critical to transmitting moderate messages throughout the Muslim world. The U.S. may need to assist moderates who lack the resources to create such networks themselves. Similarly, inviting Muslim leaders to speak in the U.S. through nongovernmental and educational initiatives is vital.

Interfaith dialogues with various religious leaders in Indonesia would also benefit mainstream Muslims in Indonesia. U.S.-based institutions such as the Institute of Interfaith Dialogue (IID) and Washington D.C.-based International Center for Religion and Diplomacy and Indonesian institutes such as Masyarakat Dialog Antar Agama (MADIA) and the Institut Dialog Antar Iman (INTERFIDEI) are well positioned to consider joint programs to enhance mutual understanding between Muslims and non-Muslims in the U.S. Closer interaction will mean that both states can better address and deal with major issues, i.e., how Islam has been misrepresented, or how U.S. policies are misinterpreted, and what needs to be done to fix those images.

The U.S. should also cultivate people-to-people ties through educational and cultural exchange initiatives among various schools, universities, research institutions, think tanks, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector.

The U.S. should also ensure that adequate resources continue to be provided for an effective visa system to prevent further decline in enrollment of Indonesian students in U.S. colleges, universities, and other institutes of higher education. In addition to visa

165 Although the U.S. enjoys religious pluralism, it is still largely perceived as a “Christian” nation.
reforms, the U.S. should include a plan to counter prevailing negative perceptions of studying and conducting research in the U.S. Study abroad by American students should also be promoted as with the expansion of Fulbright scholarships and Peace Corp-type programs. Other educational initiatives such as the American Field Exchange (AFS) among high school students should also be encouraged.

To engage the business community, sponsorship of private dialogue between Indonesian and U.S. private sector representatives from the Indonesian committee of the U.S-ASEAN Business Council, the Jakarta-based American Chamber of Commerce, New-York based American-Indonesian Chamber of Commerce, the Washington-based United States-Indonesia Society, and other similar organizations could be included.

With Indonesia’s diversity in culture and religion, U.S. policymakers should consider programs that present a balanced view of American democracy, society, and ways of life. Even though the official national language is Bahasa Indonesia, there are as many as 725 other languages and dialects spoken in Indonesia. There is a need to reach different audiences with different media and different messages. With more than 139 radio stations and 300 TV stations in Indonesia, it would be worthwhile to consider differing modes of communication rather than the typical conveyance of the message by U.S. embassy representatives. Television is still the primary source of information for most Indonesians, unlike the internet or radio. The use of digital media (i.e., sending SMS messages) has been shown to be effective.

In spite of the different media in Indonesia such as discussion circles, radio talk shows, weekly newspaper columns and journals, all designed to promote dialogue among liberal, controversial, moderate and radical elements of the Muslim community, most Indonesians are still ill informed and confused about international issues like globalization and U.S. foreign policy and are still figuring out issues like gender, democracy, etc. Public opinion survey and polling should be conducted periodically to gauge if and why Indonesian Muslims are distrustful of U.S. foreign policy.

2) Increase aid

The U.S. is the second largest bilateral donor in Indonesia, behind Japan. The total USAID budget for Indonesia in FY2005 is $102.8 million. In addition, the U.S.

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166 The American Indonesian Exchange Foundation (AMINEF) has announced that 70 Indonesians, a record number are studying in the U.S. as Fulbright scholars.

167 For example, the Voice of America’s Indonesian Service launched a new version called the VOA Direct Connection, aimed at the youth population but opinion surveys show that less than one-third of Indonesians listen to radio and when they do, more than 60 percent listen to music. “Public Opinion Survey Indonesia 2005,” Jasa Riset Indonesia and International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), 2005. Available at http://www.ifes.org/searchable/ifes_site/PDF/new_initiatives/2005_Indonesia_Survey_Report_English.pdf

168 President SBY was quoted as saying, “If you think (government officials) don’t care, never come to you and your problems are left unsettled, my cellular phone is active 24 hours a day,” at the launch of the Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry Revitalization Program at Jathiluhur. His number was listed as 0811109949. Quoted in The Jakarta Post, June 12, 2005.
and Indonesia signed two agreements that will provide an additional $65 million in U.S. assistance to support local community goals. These projects, if administered correctly, will project the image that U.S. values are congruous with U.S. interests and counter the perception that the U.S. is domineering and uncaring.

Democratic reforms

Over 80 percent of eligible Indonesians participated in its first direct presidential election. More than 74 percent of Indonesians want reform. These findings show that the U.S. must continue to support Indonesia’s efforts toward democratic reform. The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) should continue to provide grants to develop mechanisms and practices that support key national institutions in Indonesia to improve their effectiveness in responding to the public. Programs to support the development of transparent, accountable, and inclusive electoral and political processes should be continued.

In addition, aid should also be given to help the political party system encourage more direct participation in the political process at the local and regional levels. More open dialogue and public discussion should be supported. With more than 5,000 NGOs in Indonesia, aid should be given to facilitate constructive dialogue on the election process among political parties, civil society, and government bodies through a series of post-election roundtables at the national and regional levels to help identify further reforms if required and, if necessary, to promote political reconciliation. Political and civil rights give people the opportunity to draw attention to general needs, and to demand appropriate public action.

Grants should also be given to nongovernmental institutions to support a vibrant civil society and increase citizen participation. The U.S. should continue collaborating with the Indonesian government in devising approaches for reconciliation of troubled areas, including investigating integrated programs to address human rights, justice, and development needs. Islamic civil society has played a key role in promoting Indonesia’s transition to democracy. Hence, the U.S. should also extend assistance to Muslim civil society groups that advocate moderation and modernity.

Furthermore, the U.S. should also help strengthen civilian control over the military and continue to cultivate ties with Indonesian military officers, the congressional embargo on military arms notwithstanding. Programs such as International Military Education and Training (IMET) not only ensure that future military leaders are exposed to American military values and practices, but these programs can also translate into increased U.S. influence and access.

Finally, the U.S. can help in media reforms by enhancing the professionalism of the Indonesian journalists through institutes such as the Southeast Asia Press Alliance and the Institute for the Free Flow of Information. While the Indonesian media need to be serious about their role and responsibilities in disseminating news fairly and
accurately, U.S. officials also need to be more accessible to Indonesian journalists in order to avoid communication gaps and rumors.

*Education*

An educated population is vital to the nation’s economic growth and a functioning democracy. Education is crucial in preparing young Indonesians to contribute constructively to a global future. Education will help check abuses of power, provide a foundation for civil society, and pave the way for economic recovery.

Indonesia has 19.4 million illiterate people. On the average, a local Indonesian attends 5 years of schooling. Only 47 percent of the population attend secondary school, and only 14 percent make it to tertiary education (compare that to the U.S. where 64 percent of high school graduates enter college). Indonesian education officials have commented that the low quality of education has led to high failure rates in national examinations (more than one-fifth of Indonesian secondary school leavers failed their National Examination in May. Provinces such as Aceh, East Kalimantan and Papua had a failure rate exceeding 50 percent while 14 schools in Yogyakarta failed to produce even one single pass.)

Declining standards in public education have provided an opening for Islamic schools as an alternative, which can and has contributed to the spread of Islamic fundamentalism. A significant number of Indonesian students are also studying in the Middle East, exposing them to Wahabism (a strict literalistic understanding of Islam). Within Indonesia, many Muslims attend the 13,000 pesantrens throughout Indonesia’s 26 provinces. While a significant number of pesantrens are from mainstream Muslim groups, a few have been linked to militant and radical groups.

Therefore, efforts must be made to increase education and literacy levels in both rural and urban areas. Establishing or strengthening higher education accreditation boards that monitor and review curricula in state and private schools is one example. There is also an urgent need for the U.S. and the international community to support reform efforts in pesantren to ensure that they provide a broad, modern education and marketable skills so that their graduates do not become marginalized and irrelevant to Indonesia’s mainstream. The U.S. can also help empower Islamic universities to produce good Muslim scholars. Some Muslims have limited knowledge of Islam and know even less about democracy.

Education should also include support for law enforcement personnel and reforms in the legal profession. The U.S. should continue working with Indonesia’s National Police (BIN) to develop training programs in key areas such as community-based policing, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, and managing the transition from a militaristic to a civilian police force. Indonesia’s law schools also need curriculum reform and other upgrading initiatives in order to professionalize its legal system. Equal support should be given to include reforms for the courts, prosecutors, judges, the attorney general’s office, and the Ministry of Justice.
Public infrastructure and health

Indonesia has an urgent need to sustain long-term development such as replacing schools, health centers, and infrastructure destroyed by the tsunami.\textsuperscript{169} Yet, the lack of formal accounting mechanisms in Indonesia, coupled with the disappearance of public records by the tsunami, have led to delays in the flow of aid. Indonesia has responded by creating an internet website “e-Acheh.org” to provide details on the assistance program. Transparency International Indonesia has also been involved in the emergency operation together with the Coalition of Indonesian NGOs and the Indonesian Corruption Watch. In addition, the American Chamber of Commerce of Indonesia has established a Disaster Relief Committee to help in the post-tsunami effort.

The U.S. response to post-tsunami crisis is important. Otherwise, victims of the stricken province may respond favorably to assistance provided by some Islamic extremist organizations. The U.S. and multilateral organizations need to assist in preventing further delays in aid and reconstruction efforts. Transparency in the program should be ensured so that the average Indonesian gets the most value for what the U.S. is providing. Local and national government agencies should ensure that money is allocated to areas with a proven track record in using the aid well. Projects can also be proposed and developed among communities to compete for scarce resources as well as to enhance the participation and ownership of those projects. This kind of aid will lift Indonesians out of poverty, provide them with resources to sustain themselves, and promote self-reliance.

In addition to post-tsunami assistance, the U.S. also needs to devote aid to help Indonesia manage its health problems. Currently, there are 130,000 Indonesians infected with HIV. UNAIDS has described Indonesia as “teetering” on the brink of a widespread epidemic. The World Health Organization (WHO) has warned that the situation in Indonesia is at its “tipping point.”\textsuperscript{170} Unfortunately, 95 percent of HIV/AIDS patients in Indonesia are unable to afford treatment.

Given this urgency, the U.S. should provide additional aid in preventive and outreach programs. One example includes setting up clinics to implement voluntary counselling and testing programs. Currently, Indonesia has a needle exchange programs at selected \textit{Puskesmas} (government community health centers). However, there should be wider coverage of this program to include groups who are most susceptible to the infection: drug users, sex workers, prisoners, street children, and \textit{waria} (transvestites).

Education and awareness are equally important. The U.S., through USAID, has worked with Muhammadiyah in a series of HIV/AIDS prevention efforts. Special training courses were organized to assist local religious leaders to better understand how

\textsuperscript{169} As of May, 2005, only $2.5 billion has been officially committed (paid) of the $6.7 billion that was originally pledged.

\textsuperscript{170} The Indonesian Ministry of Health say that the HIV surveys do not show the real magnitude of the HIV as many infected Indonesians in rural areas are unaccounted for.
to incorporate messages of HIV/AIDS preventive measures into their sermons. The U.S. should consider helping set up additional outreach vehicles. The Spiritia Foundation, funded by the Australian Agency for International Development, is the only Jakarta-based support group that trains counsellors to help HIV/AIDS patients cope with the emotional trauma.

In addition, the U.S. should help Indonesia’s current battles with the outbreak of polio. Although the UNICEF has supported the emergency vaccination of children in an attempt to halt the spread of an outbreak, and has contributed an additional $1.3 million to the campaign, the overall response is expected to cost around $4 million. So far, 155 children are known to have contracted the virus.

Another area that requires U.S. aid is controlling bird flu. Three family members in Indonesia have already died from the deadly HN51 virus. To stem the spread of the disease, the World Health Organization (WHO) recommended mass culling, but Jakarta lacks funds.171 Health officials fear that a widespread outbreak in humans could set in motion a global flu pandemic, which could claim 2 million people in Asia and 7 million globally. Aid should be dedicated for research into the H5N1 virus, surveillance of animals so outbreaks can be detected, transparency in reporting outbreaks, vaccination and detection kits to diagnose early symptoms, and culling programs. The U.S. should also provide aid to train public health experts. An integrated, multilateral approach also requires building a centralized public health system for disease surveillance and control.

3) Increase capacity

Indonesia has shown tremendous economic progress in the recent year. Growth (net of inflation) came in at an annualized rate above 6 percent in the first quarter, the fastest pace since the financial crisis in 1998. The Jakarta Composite Index has doubled. The rupiah has been moderately stable for several years and trades at 9,700 to the dollar (in 1998, it was trading at 15,000). While macroeconomic stability has been restored, down-side risks loom large, such as the lack of transparency and accountability, foreign direct investment, and efficient use of natural resources and labor.

Programs that promote economic expansion and self-sufficiency can help reduce the opportunities for extremists to exploit economic hardship and the perception that the U.S. has only military interests in the Muslim world. As such, the U.S. government and the private sector can assist Indonesia achieve socially shared and ecologically sustainable high economic growth through several capacity-building initiatives.

171 Reports show that Jakarta has 104 billion rupiah available but needs 800 billion for mass culling.
Governance

Indonesia ranks among the worst in Southeast Asia in governance. Since the onset of the Asian crisis in 1997, Indonesia has lagged in making improvements in corporate governance. The World Bank has been highly critical of Indonesia’s weaknesses in areas of law and regulation enforcement, corporate transparency and disclosure, and the independence of independent directors. Despite the government’s introduction of a national Code for Good Corporate Governance (CGCG) two decades ago, progress in governance reforms has been slow. For example, all the major international accounting firms operate in Indonesia under arrangements with domestic accounting firms, but accounting standards and practices are not considered consistent with international norms.

The Asian Development Bank also reported that on average, the top 5 largest shareholders in Indonesia control from 65 percent to over 67 percent of company shares, creating high risks in corporate governance. The degree of investor protection in Indonesia is also the lowest in Southeast Asia. The duties of the board of directors and board of commissioners (komisaris) are unclear, blurred, and ineffective. Deficient lending and investing patterns are further undermined by cross ownership between banks and industrial concerns. Legal protection is weak due to the inefficient judiciary system. A 2001 survey by Partnership for Governance Reform ranked the judiciary as the most corrupt public institution in Indonesia.

Ensuring governance is critical if Indonesia wants to sustain national competitiveness and develop its economy. An integrated system that includes modern and consistent economic laws and courts that uphold these modern laws is vital. A concerted effort to enhance integrity and eradicate corruption must include every sector and group – public sector, statutory agencies, government-linked companies, and the private sector.

Meeting these challenges will require a change in industry standards and practices, attitudes, and knowledge. The U.S. and multilateral banks can coordinate their programs in Indonesia and work with Indonesia’s National Committee on Good Corporate Governance because Indonesia’s governance-related laws and regulations are being aligned more with those of the U.S. Critical areas include upgrading regulations, developing personnel, and helping Indonesian auditors and regulatory agencies such as

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172 The OECD has set out five principles of corporate governance, they were focused on (1) the right of shareholders, (2) the equitable treatment of shareholders, (3) the role of shareholders, (4) disclosure and transparency, and (5) the responsibilities of the board of directors. A survey conducted by Transparency International in 2004 reported that companies in Indonesia spend 5 percent of their annual sales on bribes every year, 62 percent of all dealings with customs officials involve some form of bribe and 56 percent of all contact with the police sees bribes changing hands.

173 It is reported that 67.3 percent of Indonesian public-listed companies are family owned while only 6.6 percent were widely held.

174 President Yudhoyono has been quoted as saying that “corruption and injustices are everywhere. Our legal framework is very weak, law enforcement does not work well. The result is that there is no investment in our country.” “President Orders Corruption Crackdown,” Associated Press, Oct. 27, 2004.
Bapepam (Capital Market Supervisory Agency) to ensure adequate transparency and disclosure. The U.S. can also help Indonesia institute accreditation tests to maintain the competence and capabilities of directors and commissioners, develop proper benchmarks, ensure sufficient disclosure and transparency, and develop a credit bureau to evaluate risks and credit assessment. These measures will restore investor confidence and attract foreign investment to Indonesia.\textsuperscript{175}

The long-term solution to this challenge is educating and creating awareness among the public. Indonesia’s deep-rooted culture of corruption, collusion, and nepotism and a weak tradition of law enforcement require an educated and more civic-minded public. Increased public participation in issues of governance will demand more accountability, transparency, and integrity in the government, and prevent misappropriation activities by politicians and bureaucrats.

\textit{Energy sector}

Indonesia’s oil and gas sector account for over 25 percent of all government revenues and almost 40 percent of total foreign direct investment. This sector has been predicted to grow by 7.2 percent in 2006. Nevertheless, the energy sector in Indonesia is plagued by corruption, weak policies, monopolistic and inefficient production, and wasteful consumption.\textsuperscript{176} Inefficiencies in this sector have cost government coffers at least $5 billion annually. Moreover, Indonesia’s state-owned Pertamina’s import quota has also been reduced to 59 million kiloliters a year from 62 million kiloliters this year, resulting in a shortage of gas which has been worsened by the 10 percent growth in the number of vehicles in Indonesia. And although Indonesia’s oil and gas downstream sector will be opened to private investors later this year, the Indonesian government has never issued regulations to facilitate efficient and transparent market competition.\textsuperscript{177} As such U.S. policy initiatives could prove useful in several areas.

Specific initiatives should be intensified to help Indonesian policy-makers, regulators, central, and local government officials make a concerted effort in providing the necessary incentives, clarity in rules, and regulations as well as safety. Technical support should be provided, especially in the review of the production-sharing contracts which have become less competitive throughout the years.\textsuperscript{178} The U.S. should also help Indonesia develop its infrastructure. These opportunities allow for innovative investments and new projects in the oil and gas sector, provided that strong governance, capabilities, and a legal system are in place. Indonesia could also boost energy

\textsuperscript{175} Surveys from McKinsey and Co. show that institutional investors are willing to pay a 25 percent premium for well-governed Indonesian companies.
\textsuperscript{177} In the past, Pertamina imported fuel and sold it domestically at government-subsidized prices.
\textsuperscript{178} The Indonesian government has boosted its share to 85 percent and foreign investors have found new exploration riskier and more expensive.
efficiency by encouraging the use of natural gas.\textsuperscript{179} The U.S. can also assist the Indonesian government develop and manage energy-conserving measures.

\textit{Small, medium enterprise (SMEs) development}

Indonesia has one of the lowest number of SMEs per 1,000 people in the region. Therefore, the U.S. should help strengthen small- and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) through macro-level policies, skill development, and grants.

The U.S. should support Indonesian efforts to develop coherent SME policies that encourage entrepreneurship. Government policy includes promoting deregulation, supporting the start-up of new businesses, reviewing corporate laws and relevant rules, strengthening the financial/capital market to facilitate new businesses, and upgrading investment laws to simplify taxes and duties. Other forms of assistance need to be provided simultaneously to decrease bank financing risks.

The U.S. should tap into expertise of the private sector to make the business environment more conducive to local entrepreneurs in Indonesia. The World Bank notes that it takes 151 days to start a business in Indonesia, compared to 41 days in China. The cost of starting a business in Jakarta is 131 percent of per capita income, compared to 47 percent in the region. Firing costs are 3 years of wages in Indonesia, compared to one year in the region. U.S. multinational companies have an important role to play because, besides creating jobs, they help raise production and productivity levels of many industries, promote technology transfer through on-the-job training, quality control, and production management. The Jakarta-based U.S. Chamber of Commerce and its counterpart (Kadin) can help establish business networks in rural areas to promote entrepreneurship. U.S. universities should also help Indonesian business schools develop public understanding of and participation in entrepreneurship.

The U.S. can also help empower women as they make up approximately 40 percent of the workforce in Indonesia. The U.S. can work with appropriate agencies and NGOs to extend micro-credit financing. For example, the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh has been very successful in developing women business owners.\textsuperscript{180}

These initiatives present opportunities for Indonesians to be more self-reliant and drive economic growth within Indonesia. U.S. initiatives must not be seen as a foreign goal imposed on Indonesia, but rather as one that the Indonesian government supports. Public-private cooperation, action and technical support, and technology transfer will help the Indonesian government counter perceptions that the U.S. desires to

\textsuperscript{179} PT. Perusahaan Gas Negara, an Indonesian-owned natural gas transmission and distribution company has received a grant from the US Trade and Development Agency to finance the feasibility study for this project in 2003. The 1,600-kilometer pipeline, starting in 2006 and to be completed by 2010, will transport up to 1,000 million cubic feet gas per day. Although the project is anticipated to require $1.1 billion in financing, several financial institutions such as the World Bank, Asian Development Bank and European Investment Bank have shown interest.

\textsuperscript{180} It is reported that the bank has a high rate of repayment, close to 98 percent.
exploit Indonesia’s resources and convince suspicious Indonesians that the U.S. is helping Indonesia achieve a healthy business climate which Indonesia badly needs.

Conclusion

This paper aims to analyze influences on public opinion among Muslims so U.S. foreign policymakers can identify actions to win the hearts and minds of Muslim Indonesia as a way to weaken support for terrorism. The campaign on the war on terror exacerbated anti-American sentiment among Muslims. Mostly, it has allowed Islamic extremists and their supporters to justify terrorist actions. Failure to address these shortcomings could have serious repercussions for regional stability, U.S. interests in Indonesia, and undermine U.S. efforts in the war on terror.

The U.S. humanitarian efforts in the aftermath of the tsunami helped create a favorable image of the U.S. among Muslims in Indonesia, showing that perceptions are malleable and efforts to engage Muslim Indonesia can produce significant shifts in attitudes. Although one can argue that money buys goodwill, the message most Indonesians received was “the U.S. cares.” The shift in public opinion underscores former President Clinton’s message: “If you live in an interdependent world where you cannot kill, jail or occupy all your enemies, you had better spend some of that money to make a world with more friends and fewer enemies.”

Indonesia is moving at a reasonable pace, given its political context, and in the right direction, but one of the most difficult tasks in the coming years will be decreasing popular support for al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Although the U.S. will not sway the hardest militants, if America were less hated among the population, militants might receive less support and sympathy. Fewer people would join their ranks and the Indonesian government would have less incentive to distance itself from Washington to curry favor with public opinion. The U.S. must recognize that military force should be only one strategy – perhaps the least effective in the long run – in an anti-terrorist campaign, which must include political, economic, and diplomatic responses.181

The contest for the hearts and minds of Indonesian Muslims is far from over. The war against Islamic terrorists is a political and ideological war; thus, it demands responses at the level of ideas. At a strategic level, it is political because the U.S. must erase the widely articulated perception of “West” vs. “Muslim.” It is “ideological” because the West must assist moderate, progressive Muslim leaders and intellectuals who want Islam to make a successful transition to modernity. This monumental task demands coherent, credible, and sustained U.S. efforts. Like most nations – and most people – Indonesians will respond to sincerity, courtesy, respect, and diplomacy. They do not respond to hectoring, posturing, threats, or hypocrisy. Closer U.S.-Indonesia relations are the first step in preventing radicalism to flourish in Southeast Asia.

The stakes could not be higher: As *The Jakarta Post* notes: “how can the U.S. undertake the task of winning the hearts and minds of the Muslim world? Well, everybody knows the U.S. has all the necessary resources: goodwill, capital and smart people.”
Appendix A

Milestones in U.S.-Indonesia Relations since Sept. 11

Sept. 11, 2001: Terrorist hijacks four U.S. planes and crashes into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and a field in Pennsylvania killing nearly 3,000 people.

Sept. 19-21, 2001: Indonesian President Megawati visits Washington; condemns the attacks on the U.S.

Sept. 25, 2001: Council of Ulemas, representing the mainstream leadership of Indonesian Islam, state any attack on Afghanistan would be an attack on Islam.


Oct. 4, 2001: Indonesia issues a political statement against terrorism and condemns anti-U.S. protests and harassment of Americans in Indonesia.


Oct. 12, 2001: Indonesian Vice President Hamzah Haz urges the U.S. to stop air attacks on Afghanistan and present solid proof to the world that Usama bin Laden was responsible for the Sept. 11 attacks.

Nov. 1, 2001: Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri urges the U.S. to halt military attacks on Afghanistan during Ramadan.

Nov. 2, 2001: Indonesia, after a long delay, agrees to freeze bank accounts of terrorist suspects as the U.S. requested.

Nov. 8, 2001: The U.S. Senate introduced several new conditions before direct military-to-military relations can be restored with Indonesia including the punishment of the individuals who murdered three humanitarian aid workers in West Timor, establishing a civilian audit of armed forces expenditures, and granting humanitarian workers access to Aceh, West Timor, West Papua, and the Moluccas.

182 Compiled from Comparative Connections, Sept. 11, 2001- June 31, 2005.
Nov. 8, 2001: Indonesia’s two largest moderate Muslim organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, discuss adopting a common strategy to counter small militant religious groups that have tarnished Indonesian Islam’s reputation through violent demonstrations against the U.S. and its allies.

Nov. 15, 2001: Indonesian authorities criticize new U.S. visa restrictions on Muslims from 25 countries as discriminating and undermining the U.S. claim that it is targeting terrorists not Islam.

Jan. 9, 2002: Indonesian Foreign Minister Hassan Wirayudha says that Indonesia had been cracking down on terrorism long before Sept. 11 and had cross-border controls in place.

Jan. 18, 2002: It is revealed that the Pentagon is resuming limited training of Indonesian forces in counterterrorism.

Jan. 29, 2002: Indonesian FM Hasan Wirayuda announces that the U.S. has offered training for Indonesian police to combat international terrorism.

Feb. 6, 2002: CIA Director George Tenet in Congressional testimony says that al-Qaeda may be connected to terrorist groups in Indonesia and the Philippines.

April 24-25, 2002: U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs Peter Brookes arrives in Jakarta to initiate a new U.S.-Indonesia security dialogue to explore restoring military cooperation severed in 1999.

May 6, 2002: Muslim students protest presence of Ambassador Boyce in Makassar, accusing him of being behind the arrest two days earlier of the leader of Laskar Jihad.

May 9, 2002: A New York Times report indicates widespread popular concern in Indonesia that the U.S.-sponsored war on terrorism will become a war on democracy as the U.S. moves to assist the Indonesian Army and police despite their histories of human rights abuses.


May 24, 2002: The U.S. House votes $8 million in aid for training Indonesian police as part of an antiterrorism bill but does not embrace the administration’s call for assistance to the Indonesian military.

May 29, 2002: Indonesian Vice President Hamzah Haz meets with a controversial Muslim cleric publicly linked by Singapore and Malaysia to a regional terrorist network and announces that, “There are no terrorists here. I guarantee that.”
June 3, 2002: In Singapore, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz calls for renewed U.S.-Indonesian military links.

July 1, 2002: Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ryacudu orders the army to disband all civilian militias in Indonesia as a threat to “public order and security.”

July 7, 2002: In testimony before the House of Representatives, Indonesian military chiefs describes a navy lacking ammunition and seaworthy ships and an air force with most of its planes grounded for lack of spare parts.

July 10, 2002: Maj. Gen. Damiri, the highest ranking Indonesian military official indicted for the military rampage in East Timor in 1999, goes on trial for allowing the forces under his command to commit violence.

July 18, 2002: The U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee votes to drop restrictions on military aid to Jakarta.

Aug. 11, 2002: Indonesia’s Parliament adjourns a two-week session in which legislators introduced constitutional changes designed to shrink the military’s role in politics and boost presidential powers (by direct popular election).


Sept. 4, 2002: Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz says the U.S. is “disappointed” with the apparent lack of will to vigorously prosecute human rights abusers within the Indonesian Armed Forces.

Sept. 10, 2002: Ambassador Boyce publicly advises U.S. investors in Indonesia to “wait for the government’s announced program of economic reforms to begin to show some signs of being implemented.”

Sept. 18, 2002: Indonesia announces it will investigate allegations that Abu Bakar Baasyir and his organization Jemaah Islamiah are involved in global terrorism.

Sept. 25, 2002: About 1,500 militant Muslims from Java and Sumatra attend a mass anti-U.S. rally in Surakarta and declare readiness to wage jihad against the U.S.

Sept. 26, 2002: Indonesian military chief Gen. Sutarto states that foreign terrorists had operated in two regions of Indonesia (Moluccas and Sulawesi), implicitly contradicting Indonesia’s vice president and supporting the U.S. ambassador.

Sept. 30, 2002: Indonesia’s chief security minister Yudhoyono announces Jakarta will send intelligence officials to the U.S. to discuss recent arrests in Java of terrorist suspects.

Nov. 27, 2002: Former pro-Jakarta militia leader Eurico Guterres found guilty of crimes against humanity during a 1999 massacre in East Timor and sentenced to 10 years in prison.


Jan. 1, 2003: Indonesian government removes subsidies on fuel, electricity, and telephone charges; prices rise by 22 percent.


Jan. 6, 2003: Indonesian police present first case to prosecutors against Bali bombing suspect known as Amrozi.

Jan. 14, 2003: Indonesian police arrest two Bali bombing suspects, bringing the number of people detained to approximately 17.

Jan. 16, 2003: U.S. adopts new measures requiring visiting male citizens from Indonesia, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, and Bangladesh to register with U.S. immigration authorities and provide fingerprints.


Jan. 21, 2003: Indonesian police recommend prosecutors charge Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, with treason (for plotting to assassinate President Megawati Sukarnoputri) and for a series of bomb attacks on Christmas Eve in 2000.

Jan. 23, 2003: U.S. Senate votes 61-36 to defeat an amendment barring funding for Indonesians in the U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET), thereby making Indonesian military officers eligible for IMET.

Feb. 25, 2003: The UN charges former Indonesian armed forces chief, Gen. Wiranto, six other military officers, and the former Indonesian governor of East Timor, Abilio Soares, with crimes against humanity for violence surrounding East Timor’s 1999 vote for independence.

March 6, 2003: Indonesia’s Parliament passes antiterror law issued by President Megawati after the Bali bombings. The regulations allow police to use intelligence data as the basis for arrests.
March 9, 2003: A 100,000 join peaceful demonstration in Surabaya, organized by the country’s largest Islamic organization, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), against military action in Iraq.

March 12, 2003: Indonesian Brig. Gen. Noer Muis is sentenced to five years in prison for failing to prevent massacres of 1,000 civilians during East Timor’s vote for independence in 1999.

March 18, 2003: Indonesia Security Minister Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono that Indonesia calls on the UN Security Council to hold an emergency meeting on Iraq, and on the international community to continue work toward a peaceful solution.

March 20, 2003: President Megawati announces Indonesia’s opposition to the U.S.-led attack on Iraq and calls for an urgent U.N. meeting.

March 30, 2003: Peaceful march by 100,000 Indonesians to U.S. Embassy in Jakarta to protest Iraq war.

April 1, 2003: Demonstrations against the U.S. war in Iraq occur in major cities throughout Indonesia, calling for a boycott of U.S. products, severance of diplomatic relations, and that President Bush be hauled before the International Criminal Court.

April 3, 2003: Indonesian Vice President Hamzah Haz calls President Bush “king of terrorists,” the only Indonesian leader to denounce the U.S. president personally.

April 5, 2003: Director General of Indonesia’s Ministry of Defense Gen. Sudrajat states that the U.S. attack on Iraq is motivated by the American war on terror and not oil.

April 10, 2003: Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri denounces the U.S. and Britain for practicing the “law of the jungle” by attacking Iraq in defiance of the UN

April 14, 2003: Indonesian prosecutors indict radical Muslim cleric Abu Bakar Bashir for plans to blow up the U.S. Embassy in Singapore and the bombings of several churches in Indonesia in December 2000.

April 25, 2003: U.S. permits families of U.S. diplomats to return to Indonesia, indicating that Jakarta’s crackdown on JI terrorists has greatly reduced the prospect of future attacks on Westerners.

July 8, 2003: Gen. Endriartono Sutarto issues statement that the Indonesian military offensive against rebels in the northern province of Aceh will last much longer than its original mandate of six months, possibly even a decade.
July 9, 2003: Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International issue report condemning alarming rise in numbers of Indonesians being jailed for their political views. The report alleges at least 46 prisoners of conscience have been jailed.

July 17, 2003: U.S. Congress approves an amendment to block $1 million through the IMET program destined for Indonesia in retaliation for lax investigation of an August 2002 attack in Papua that killed two U.S. citizens and an Indonesian.

July 28, 2003: Indonesia’s senior economic minister, Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti, announces the government will not renew its program with the IMF when it expires in December but will accept post-program monitoring while it pays down its nearly $10 billion IMF debt.

Aug. 5, 2003: A car bomb explodes outside a Marriott hotel in Jakarta killing 12 and injuring over 100. Vice President Hamzah Haz said it appeared the attack was directed at U.S. interests. Indonesian officials have warned of possible attacks by JI some of whose members are on trial for the October 2002 Bali bombings.

Aug. 13, 2003: Indonesian police, in a raid on a JI house in June, find documents listing U.S. companies such as Halliburton, Exxon-Mobil, and Unocal as targets, according to the Los Angeles Times.

Aug. 18, 2003: Indonesia seeks the extradition of captured terrorist mastermind Hambali, now in U.S. custody, who is suspected to be involved in several bombings, including those in Bali and the most recent Jakarta Marriott explosion.

Sept. 2, 2003: U.S. avoids comment on the conviction and four year sentence of radical Islamic cleric Abu Bakir Bashyir for attempting to overthrow the Indonesian government. He was found not guilty of the more serious charge of planning the Christmas 2000 church bombings in Indonesia.

Sept. 3, 2003: Vice President Hamzah calls the U.S. the “terrorist king” for its war in Iraq in a speech before Muslim schools in Java.

Sept. 4, 2003: FM Hassan Wirayuda questions U.S. commitment to fight terrorism because it has not permitted Indonesian authorities to interrogate captured Indonesian terrorist Hambali.

Sept. 5, 2003: U.S. blocks the assets of 10 people allegedly associated with JI group believed to be behind the October 2002 and August 2003 Bali and Jakarta Marriott bombings.

Sept. 23, 2003: President Megawati, speaking to the UN General Assembly, criticizes the U.S. war in Iraq as creating more problems that it resolved.
Oct. 2, 2003: Indonesian police demand direct access to captured JI terrorist Hambali in U.S. custody. While Washington has provided interrogation information, it has not yet permitted access by any Southeast Asian state to Hambali.


Oct. 15, 2003: In an interview with Jakarta-TV, President Bush downplays Indonesian requests for direct access to Hambali and promises to share interrogation information.

Oct. 16, 2003: President Bush launches his Asia trip with a statement that Indonesia cannot let its Islamic community be defined by religious extremists.

Oct. 21, 2003: President Bush visits Bali, speaks with moderate Muslim leaders and meets with President Megawati.

Oct. 25, 2003: A high-level Indonesian police official states the U.S. has agreed to transfer Hambali to Jakarta for prosecution after the U.S. completes its interrogation.

Nov. 6, 2003: Indonesian National Police chief reports that the U.S. State Department’s Security Service is training top-flight Indonesian police units in antiterror skills and upgrading their equipment.

Nov. 6, 2003: Indonesia extends martial law in Aceh for an additional six months. The U.S., Japan, and European Union issue statements of concern, which are dismissed as a prelude to “meddling.”

Dec. 8, 2003: FM Hasan Wirajuda at a Jakarta CSCAP meeting, criticizes the war in Iraq as unilateral, arbitrary, and preemptive, the results of which have made the world more dangerous and exacerbated terrorist actions.

Dec. 15, 2003: State Department criticizes Indonesia’s decision to appoint a controversial police general to head the police force in Papua province. Brig. Gen. Timbul Silaen was indicted by UN prosecutors for his role in East Timor violence attendant upon the 1999 independence vote. Cleared by an Indonesian court, the UN indictment still stands.

Jan. 16, 2004: Indonesia criticizes Australian decision to join the U.S. plan to build a regional missile defense, calling it “offensive” and fearing it may push China into a harsh response.

Jan. 16, 2004: U.S. puts a half dozen leading current and former Indonesian military officers on a watch list of indicted war criminals, including a leading presidential candidate, Gen. Wiranto, effectively barring them from entering the U.S. This comes as the Bush administration increases its antiterrorism ties to Indonesia’s military.
Jan. 18, 2004: VP Hamzah Haz complains that the U.S. is requiring Indonesian banks to repay loans when the banks had not yet recovered from the 1997-98 financial crisis.

Jan. 21, 2004: Ambassador Boyce says that Washington is considering giving Indonesian investigators direct access to captured JI terrorist leader Hambali.

Feb. 20, 2004: Indonesia and the U.S. sign an agreement on the peaceful exploitation of nuclear energy designed to protect Indonesian facilities from terrorist attacks.

Feb. 23, 2004: In a speech to the International Islamic Scholars Conference in Jakarta, President Megawati castigates the U.S. occupation of Iraq as unjust to Muslims.

March 10, 2004: U.S. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher and visiting U.S. Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge express “extreme disappointment” in the Indonesian Supreme Court’s decision to reduce convicted JI spiritual leader Abu Bakar Bashir’s three-year prison sentence to time-served.

March 31, 2004: Adm. Fargo, Commander of U.S. Pacific Command, proposes a regional maritime security initiative to help guard the strategic Malacca Strait against terrorist attacks. Malaysia and Indonesia oppose the plan.

April 5, 2004: Indonesians vote in parliamentary elections.

April 6, 2004: Malaysia and Indonesia reject U.S. proposed Regional Maritime Security Initiative to help patrol the Malacca Strait.

April 21, 2004: Former Indonesian armed forces leader Wiranto, one of seven Indonesian military officials indicted by the UN on war crimes in East Timor in 1999, wins Golkar party presidential nomination.

April 29, 2004: State Department releases 2003 Patterns of Global Terrorism Report, which identifies the Asia-Pacific region in general and Southeast Asia in particular, as “an attractive theater of support and logistics” for al-Qaeda, and “a theater of operations” for JI (JI).

April 30, 2004: Indonesian authorities re-arrest Muslim cleric Abu Bakar Bashir on terrorist charges immediately after his release from prison where he has served 18 months on immigration violations.

May 10, 2004: Speaking in Jakarta, Assistant Secretary James Kelly emphasizes Indonesia and Malaysia are more than capable of safeguarding the Malacca Strait.

May 12, 2004: At ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) senior officials meeting in Yogyakarta, U.S. proposes plan for maritime security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific.
ASEAN members welcome initiative but emphasize the U.S. would not be given operational patrolling duties.

**June 17, 2004:** Indonesia’s naval chief announces his country will form a special maritime force to coordinate patrols in the Malacca Strait after Indonesian pirates conduct yet another attack in the area.

**June 22, 2004:** Indonesia and Malaysia agree to conduct joint military patrols in the Malacca Strait to stem piracy and maritime terrorist threats.

**June 24, 2004:** U.S. grand jury indicts Anthonius Wamang, alleged operational commander of the separatist Free Papua Movement, for the 2002 murder of two U.S. schoolteachers in the Indonesian province of Papua. Wamang remains at large.

**July 2, 2004:** Secretary Powell at an ARF meeting in Jakarta expresses regret over the difficulty foreigners have obtaining visas for the U.S. and promises that “a more normal set of standards” will be restored.

**July 16, 2004:** Indonesia and Cambodia are among a group of countries that will share in a $50 million aid plan announced by President Bush to combat human trafficking.

**July 28, 2004:** Indonesian prosecutors drop charges against jailed cleric Abu Bakar Bashir for the 2002 Bali bombing after the Constitutional Court rules that an counterterror law passed after the Bali bombing cannot be applied retroactively. Bashir remains in jail and will be charged with leading the regional terrorist organization, JI.

**July 29, 2004:** Ambassador Boyce congratulates President Megawati on Indonesia’s successful first round of presidential elections and expresses surprise at criticism of foreign election monitors for allegedly interfering.

**Aug. 6, 2004:** U.S. State Department expresses “dismay” and “profound disappointment” over the decision by an Indonesian appeals court to overturn the conviction of three Indonesian army officers and a policeman convicted of the massacre of hundreds of East Timorese during the 1999 independence referendum.

**Aug. 29, 2004:** U.S. pledges $168 million in aid over five years to Indonesia, much of it to reform school curriculum in hopes of combating Islamist extremism. Of the total, $236 million is earmarked for other human services and $75 million to food assistance.

**Sept. 3, 2004:** U.S. issues new warnings to its citizens to avoid Western hotels in Jakarta following fresh concerns that terrorists are targeting locations frequented by Westerners. Indonesian police said they were unaware of any new threats.
Sept. 9, 2004: Suicide truck bomber kills 10 people and injures 180 when his vehicle detonates adjacent to the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, the third major suicide bomb incident in Indonesia after Bali 2002 and the Jakarta Marriott in 2003.


Sept. 23, 2004: U.S. Embassy in Jakarta criticizes Indonesian police for detaining without charge several U.S. executives of the P.T. Newmount mining company over allegations of dumping hazardous waste into Buyat Bay in North Sulawesi. While expressing support for Indonesia’s judicial system, the embassy warned that arbitrary arrests could further harm the investment climate in the country.

Oct. 11, 2004: Outgoing U.S. Ambassador Boyce says Indonesia “missed opportunity to restore military ties.”

Oct. 20, 2004: Susilo Bambang Yudohono (SBY) becomes Indonesia’s new president.


Oct. 25, 2004: Indonesia to buy military equipment from East Europe and Japan.

Nov. 10, 2004: Defense Minister Sudarsono visits Washington to discuss arms embargo.

Nov. 25, 2004: Indonesia rejects U.S. conditions for military cooperation.


Dec. 15, 2004: Indonesia offers new evidence in case against Newmont Mining.

Dec. 17, 2004: U.S. issues new travel warnings for Indonesia, citing reports that terrorists were planning new attacks.

Dec. 26, 2004: Powerful earthquake off Indonesian coast creates tsunami waves that shock South and Southeast Asia and Africa; the estimated death toll hits 155,000, with more than 94,000 killed in Indonesia.

Jan. 4, 2005: Commenting on television coverage of U.S. service personnel providing aid in Banda Aceh, Secretary of State Powell states that, “it does give the Muslim world ... an opportunity to see American generosity and American values in action.”
Jan. 6, 2005: Secretary Powell meets in Jakarta with heads of Asian states and donor countries to plan for relief flows and post-tsunami reconstruction. He agrees to relax U.S. restrictions on spare parts for Indonesian aircraft needed to deliver supplies.

Jan. 9, 2005: President Yudhoyono and other senior government and military officials as well as Muslim leaders all say that Indonesians should put aside their political differences with the U.S. and welcome its humanitarian aid in Aceh province.

Jan. 10, 2005: Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly promises that the U.S. will provide full assistance in helping to create an Indian Ocean tsunami warning system.

Jan. 13, 2005: Indonesia asks all foreign troops to complete humanitarian missions by March 31. *USS Abraham Lincoln* leaves Indonesian territorial waters for international waters after Jakarta refused to permit it to continue training flights for its combat aircraft in Indonesian air space. Aid flights from the carrier continue.

Jan. 13, 2005: U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia B. Lynn Pascoe says Indonesia has “every right” to decide how long U.S. forces are needed in Aceh and that an end of March deadline is “reasonable.”

Jan. 15, 2005: Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz, observing the Aceh coastline from a helicopter, avers that quick response by the U.S. military to the tsunami disaster probably saved thousands of lives. He also said that the U.S. goal is to end its military presence in Indonesia as soon as possible.

Jan. 19, 2005: Secretary Wolfowitz notes that President Yudhoyono cancelled his military leadership’s placement of a specific date for a U.S. military exit.

Jan. 19, 2005: Secretary Wolfowitz backs IMET restoration for Indonesian military officers to provide human rights education.

Feb. 4, 2005: Carrier *USS Abraham Lincoln* withdraws from the coast of Sumatra where it had been involved in tsunami relief operations since late December. The Navy hospital ship *USS Mercy* arrives in Banda Aceh.

Feb. 9, 2005: U.S. almost triples tsunami relief pledge to $950 million, making it the largest government donor and the largest disaster relief pledge in U.S. history.

Feb. 18, 2005: Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice proposes to reinstate U.S. military training programs for Indonesian military officers. The programs had been suspended since the 1992 and 1999 human rights violations committed by Indonesian soldiers during East Timor independence agitation and subsequent referendum.

Feb. 20, 2005: Former Presidents Bush and Clinton visit Banda Aceh and pledge additional recovery assistance.
March 1, 2005: Indonesia welcomes U.S. plan to resume IMET for Indonesia.

March 3, 2005: Indonesian court convicts alleged al-Qaeda-linked JI leader Abu Bakar Bashir on one count of criminal conspiracy but acquits him of all terrorism charges related to the Bali, Jakarta Marriott, and Australian Embassy bombings. The U.S. and Australia express deep disappointment with the verdict.

March 13, 2005: Indonesian Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono arrives in Washington to discuss resumption of full military relations.

March 28, 2005: Magnitude 8.7 earthquake strikes Sumatra.

March 31, 2005: Hospital ship *USS Mercy* and supply vessel dispatched to earthquake-struck island off the Sumatran coast.

April 29, 2005: *USS Mercy* wraps up emergency assistance in Nias.

April 29, 2005: U.S. trade representative announces that Indonesia will remain on the Special Priority Watch List for 2005, after reviewing the country’s trade practices for intellectual property rights protection.

May 8, 2005: Deputy Secretary Of State Robert Zoellick signs a memorandum of understanding with Jakarta for reconstruction of road from Banda Aceh to Meulaboh, a $245 million project.

May 25, 2005: President Bush meets President Yudhoyono at the White House. Bush announces the U.S. will donate another $400 million for tsunami relief, bringing the total official U.S. contribution to $857 million, and that Indonesian participation in the IMET program will resume after 14 years.

May 26, 2005: U.S. and Indonesia resume energy consultations after eight-year hiatus.

June 15, 2005: U.S. and Indonesia sign a debt referral agreement, rescheduling $212 million to help Indonesia free up resources for tsunami assistance.

June 20, 2005: Officials meet under U.S.-Indonesian Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) to discuss intellectual property rights, agriculture, customs and the domestic investment climate.

June 23, 2005: AID Director Andrew Natsios announces that $656 million in aid to Indonesia, part of the package requested by President Bush for tsunami relief, has been released by the Office of Management and Budget.
June 23, 2005: The Pew Global Attitudes Project releases a new survey of the Muslim world, which indicates that Indonesian approval of the U.S. has doubled since the tsunami relief operation, but still lags pre-2001 levels.
Appendix B

About the Author

Lena Kay was the 2004 Vasey Fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS and a current Pacific Asian scholar at the University of Hawaii-Manoa. A Malaysian citizen, she has a M.B.A. (distinction) in finance and international business from Beloit College and is completing her M.A. in international relations at the University of Hawaii. Lena has more than 10 years of experience in consulting and management in the Asia Pacific region. Her past clients have included a global bank, financial institutions, and family-owned businesses. She has conducted research and taught at academic institutions in Singapore, and co-authored several papers in peer reviewed journals and industry publications. Her research interests include U.S.-Muslim relations, U.S.-ASEAN relations and governance in emerging markets.